Kaliningrad is the key to the Baltic. By sea, it is the Russian Federation’s only ice-free port in northern Europe. By land, it abuts the narrow border between Poland and Lithuania, perfectly positioned to cut the Baltic States off from contiguous NATO territory. By air, the S-400 missiles stationed on its territory have the range to reach right across the sea.

 

In any conflict between NATO and Russia, Kaliningrad would surely play a central role.

 

But is such a conflict on the cards? To judge by the rhetoric on both sides, the answer is ‘Quite possibly’: Kaliningrad has been frequently mentioned as a potential flashpoint by both analysts and politicians. However, to cite an oft-repeated Russian mantra, it’s not intentions which count, but capabilities, and the capabilities of the Russian military in Kaliningrad have yet to be studied in sufficient detail.

 

This paper seeks to redress that lack. It looks at the current state of tensions over the Baltic arena; the rhetoric used by both sides; and the state of the Russian forces in the exclave and in Belarus.

 

RUSSIA AND THE BALTIC  

 

Kaliningrad has long been one of the most heavily-militarised parts of Russia, home not only to the Baltic Fleet but to a substantial array of land and air forces. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the restoration of the Baltic States’ independence, cutting Kaliningrad off from rump Russia, the Kremlin has viewed it as a particularly important strategic asset, listing it as a priority area for the resettlement of Russian-speakers from abroad under the State Programme for Assistance to Voluntary Resettlement of Compatriots Living Abroad.[1]

 

In January 2015, General Valeriy Gerasimov, chief of the Russian General Staff, underlined its continued military importance in an interview with RIA Novosti:

 

‘In 2015, the Defence Ministry’s main efforts will focus on an increase of combat capabilities of the armed forces and increasing the military staff in accordance with military construction plans. Much attention will be given to the groupings in Crimea, Kaliningrad, and the Arctic.’[2]

 

Three months later, Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu called for a strengthening of the Baltic Fleet as a matter of priority; [3] while in July, Russia’s updated naval doctrine identified ‘the solution of long-term tasks in the Baltic Sea’ as one of its top priorities, before similar tasks in the Black, Azov and Mediterranean Seas. [4]   

 

Not by chance, that naval doctrine was released on Russia’s Navy Day, 26 June, and presented to President Putin by a glittering array of senior officials including Shoigu, Navy chief Viktor Chirkov and Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin, in Baltiysk, Kaliningrad. The fact that the presentation was made in the northern enclave, and not in the newly-conquered Crimea, signals the importance the Kremlin attaches to the region.

 

The doctrine itself sets out 14 priority areas for its Baltic Sea presence, including ‘Development of forces (military) and also the systems for basing the Baltic Fleet’. The strategic context? Rivalry with NATO throughout the North Atlantic region, which for the purposes of the doctrine includes the Baltic Sea:

 

‘National maritime policy in the direction of the Atlantic region is defined by the conditions in that region, oriented solely towards NATO, together with the inadequacy of legal mechanisms for ensuring international security. In relations with NATO, the defining factor is the unacceptability of plans to advance the alliance’s military infrastructure towards the borders of the Russian Federation and attempts to give it global functions.’

 

This dovetails with Russia’s military doctrine, updated in December, which identifies NATO explicitly as the number one risk to Russia:

 

‘12. The main external military risks are:

a) build-up of the power potential of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and vesting NATO with global functions carried out in violation of the rules of international law, bringing the military infrastructure of NATO member countries near the borders of the Russian Federation, including by further expansion of the alliance;

b) destabilization of the situation in individual states and regions and undermining of global and regional stability;

c) deployment (build-up) of military contingents of foreign states (groups of states) in the territories of the states contiguous with the Russian Federation and its allies, as well as in adjacent waters, including for exerting political and military pressure on the Russian Federation;

d) establishment and deployment of strategic missile defense systems undermining global stability and violating the established balance of forces related to nuclear missiles, implementation of the global strike concept, intention to place weapons in outer space, as well as deployment of strategic non-nuclear systems of high-precision weapons; (…)’

 

NATO enlargement, troop deployments and missile defence: in every case, it is Kaliningrad, together with the Leningrad Oblast, which is on the front line.

 

THE ISKANDERS OF DAMOCLES 

 

That front-line status became apparent in November 2008 during the standoff between presidents Medvedev and Bush over the latter’s plan to station elements of the missile-defence system in Poland and the Czech Republic. In response, Medvedev said:

 

‘We will deploy the Iskander missile system in the Kaliningrad Region to be able, if necessary, to neutralise the missile defence system. Naturally, we envisage using the resources of the Russian Navy for these purposes as well. And finally, electronic jamming of the new installations of the U.S. missile defence system will be carried out from the territory of the same westernmost region that is from Kaliningrad.’ [5]

 

Since then, Kaliningrad and the Iskander (SS-26 ’Stone’) question have served as a bellwether of U.S.-Russian relations. In September 2009, following the decision by U.S. President Barack Obama to scrap Bush’s plans, Medvedev announced that ‘of course’ he had decided against the Iskander deployment. [6]

 

There followed the ‘reset’, the Obama-led engagement with Russia, and the NATO-Russia Council summit in Lisbon in November 2010. That was the high point of the rapprochement, and Kaliningrad and its potential role as a missile base fell out of public discourse.

 

But a year after Lisbon, with talks over Obama’s Phased Adaptive Approach to missile defence stalled, Medvedev raised the threat once again. [7] Accusing the U.S. and NATO of ‘not showing enough will’ to compromise, he announced four immediate counter-measures, the first of which was to place the Kaliningrad missile-defence radar on combat alert. What caught world attention, however, was his final, conditional step:

 

‘Fifth, if the above measures prove insufficient, the Russian Federation will deploy modern offensive weapon systems in the west and south of the country, ensuring our ability to take out any part of the US missile defence system in Europe. One step in this process will be to deploy Iskander missiles in Kaliningrad Region.’

 

It should be noted, however, that the threat was conditional: ‘if the above measures prove insufficient’. And indeed, for the next two years, nothing was heard of the Iskanders. During that period, up to the end of 2013, NATO-Russia cooperation slowly improved, with joint efforts to counter piracy and to support the nascent Afghan air force and, at the very end of 2013, an agreement to jointly support efforts to destroy Syria’s chemical weapons.

 

Feathers were briefly ruffled in mid-December 2013, when Germany’s Bild reported that the missiles had in fact been stationed in Kaliningrad for a year and a half, but after a week of confusion and contradictory statements, on 20 December Putin insisted that no decision had been taken.[8]

 

That changed a year later. In December 2014, media reported that Iskanders had been temporarily deployed to Kaliningrad as part of a nationwide military exercise.[9] The move was repeated in March 2015.[10] In each case, officials quickly confirmed at the end of the exercises that the missiles had been returned to their bases in mainland Russia; but these actual deployments, even for a limited period, clearly show how Russia has moved beyond rhetoric to changing the reality on the ground.

 

ARMS AND THE MEDIA

 

While the Iskanders are the most eye-catching deployment, they are not the only one. In a less widely-heralded move in April 2012, Russia deployed S-400 surface-to-air missiles to the exclave.[11] Since then, the Kremlin’s tabloid newswire, Sputnik, has flagged up other capability developments.

 

In July 2015, for example, the wire reported on the delivery of three new landing craft ‘able to take on any enemy coastal positions’ to the Baltic Fleet,[12] while in March it trumpeted the transfer of Su-34 and Su-27 combat aircraft [13] to the region. It has consistently reported on the launching of new warships from the Yantar shipyard in Kaliningrad, although it should be noted that these are destined for the Arctic and Black Sea fleets.

 

Perhaps most ominously, given the context of Russia’s military and maritime doctrines, in July it also reported a claim from a Russian naval captain that ‘the Baltic Fleet will again dominate over the trans-Atlantic region’.[14]

 

In short, seen from Moscow, Kaliningrad is Russia’s number one strategic asset in any confrontation with NATO; and according to Russia’s leaders and its official military doctrine, that confrontation is already ongoing.

 

THE VIEW FROM THE WEST

 

Certainly that message has been heeded in parts of the West, especially Lithuania, sensitive to its vulnerability as the only country to be sandwiched between two parts of Russia.

 

On November 28, Lithuanian analyst Marius Laurinavičius published a study summarising experts’ views of Russia’s possible intentions and options in its confrontation with the West:

 

‘Another expert, Viktor Myasnikov, notes: “If necessary, Lithuania could easily be converted into a corridor between Kaliningrad and the main territory of Russia.” Lithuanian military experts have more than once mentioned that the scenario of an occupation of Lithuania and at least a corridor into Kaliningrad has already been played out in military exercises. It is therefore quite possible that plans like this were entertained even when there wasn’t open talk in Russia of a world war with the West.’ [15]

Further experts interviewed by the Charter 97 non-governmental organisation have echoed that message, warning of a potential Russian wish to forge a land corridor to Kaliningrad.[16]

 

The notion of Kaliningrad as both a potential casus belli, and a heavily-armed forward base capable of launching massive attacks, has spread widely through the Western media. Newsweek, for example, wrote in March that weapons were flooding into the exclave,[17] while in June Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty wrote of weapons and thousands of troops pouring in.[18] In March, the diplomatic temperature was briefly raised when Lithuania blocked a trainload of students heading into Kaliningrad, reportedly suspecting that they were regular forces in disguise.[19]

 

In an apparent sign that media concerns are shared by the military, the RFE/RL piece quoted an unnamed NATO official as saying that Moscow is stationing "thousands of troops, including mechanized and naval infantry brigades, military aircraft, modern long-range air defence units and hundreds of armoured vehicles in the territory."

 

Those western military concerns, in their turn, are translating into action. Poland has announced plans to invest in Patriot missile-defence batteries as a counter to the Iskander threat, and to build watchtowers along the Kaliningrad border;[20] Lithuania has decided to reintroduce conscription;[21] the three Baltic States and Poland have together decided to look at the possibility of acquiring a joint air-defence system.[22] NATO has stationed extra fighter aircraft in northern Poland, Lithuania and Estonia, and conducted high-visibility maritime exercises in the Baltic Sea.

 

Analysts are already focusing on what form a Russian attack on the Baltic States could take, especially regarding the creation of a ‘land corridor’ to Kaliningrad,[23] and how the West should respond; and on the back of that debate, the Baltics and Poland are pushing for the permanent stationing of NATO forces on their territory, to act as a tripwire and delay any Russian attack for long enough to allow NATO troops from further afield to deploy. [24] The demand looks certain to dominate the debate at the NATO summit in Warsaw next July.

 

In short, Russia is talking about Kaliningrad, and the West is worrying about it. Both sides are apparently committed to arming in the Baltic theatre, and the danger of rising tensions leading to clashes cannot be omitted.

 

However, before sounding the alarm bells, it is important to look at the capabilities behind the words.

 

THE CONTEXT

 

In any discussion of the modern capabilities and function of Kaliningrad, its capabilities and function in the past should serve as a starting point. Viewed in the long-term perspective, the capabilities of the Russian forces deployed to the Kaliningrad enclave have decreased significantly.

 

Throughout the Cold War, Kaliningrad served as a heavily-armed forward base capable of projecting power throughout the Baltic region. Western intelligence reports from the early 1990s credited the Baltic Fleet with 85,000 men, 20 submarines, 3 cruisers, 5 destroyers, 29 frigates, many other craft and amphibious units. In addition, the fleet deployed 620 main battle tanks, 940 armoured vehicles, 695 artillery guns, 155 combat aircraft and 95 helicopters. ^[25] With armoured, tank, and motorized rifle units supported by missile and self-propelled artillery divisions and naval strike aviation regiments, this formidable force fielded enough equipment to run complex, high-intensity combined arms operations.

 

After the end of the Cold War, the status and size of the Russian forces deployed to the Kaliningrad Oblast declined in line with an overall decrease of combat capabilities across the Russian Armed Forces. As a result, in the early 2000s only about 20,000 personnel were stationed in the enclave, with woeful levels of readiness, ill-maintained equipment and plummeting morale.  Where the Kaliningrad forces of Soviet were capable of significant power projection, those of the early 2000s were barely capable of limited local defence and deterrence.

 

Troop numbers have further declined in recent years, to the approximately 15,000 deployed there presently. This force is supported by around 50 aircraft, 30 helicopters, 55 various vessels and an estimated 200 T-72 and T-80 main battle tanks.[26]

 

Source: IHS Jane’s

 

NAVAL CAPABILITIES

 

The bulk of the 15,000 personnel in the Kaliningrad are associated with the Baltic Fleet, making it the main focus of Russian naval power in the Baltic Sea.

 

Its surface combatants are divided into the 36^th Missile Boat Brigade, the 128^th Surface Ship Brigade, and the 71^st Landing Ship Brigade. Altogether this creates a 35-vessel force. Quantitatively this looks impressive, especially in comparison with regional navies (see map 1); however, a closer look at these assets reveals that the average age of ships presently stationed in the enclave is almost 19 years. This is still significantly better than the Russian Navy in general, where the average age of Russia's large surface combatants, even excluding the two oldest vessels, is 29 years, compared to approximately 23 years in in the Swedish Navy.[27]

 

 

Source: IISS Military Balance 2015

 

Naturally, there are exceptions to this general rule. Since 2010 Russian naval assets in Kaliningrad have been augmented by three new Steregushchiy-class corvettes and three Dyugon-class landing craft, the subject of Sputnik’s bombast (see above). As such, 17% of the Baltic Fleets vessels currently deployed to the region are 5 years old or less. Nor do the current figures mean that Russia is not developing or procuring new vessels. The overall Russian modernization plan, the State Armament Programme 2020 (SAP-2020), is slowly being pursued, but to judge by the allocation of assets, Moscow presently does not consider the Baltic Sea to be a theatre where reinforcements are particularly needed. This is shown by plans to deploy the newly-built Admiral Gorshkov-class and Admiral Grigorovich-class frigates to the Northern and Black Sea fleets respectively.[28]

 

Moscow views the construction of both frigates as a milestone in the rebirth of Russian shipbuilding. However, although the frigates are the largest vessels laid down in the post-Soviet era, their classification shows how far the Russian naval industry has declined. The navy regards them as 'first rank' ships for operations at distance. The Soviet Navy, by contrast, classified even destroyers as 'second rank' ships. It should also be noted that there are concerns over the future of the Gorshkov class’ follow-on ships, after Ukraine cancelled plans to provide their turbines.[29]

 

Nonetheless, the Admiral Grigorovich-class vessels merit attention, as the class incorporates a stealthy hull and is designed to have low radar, acoustic and infrared signatures. The assignment of the first in the class to the Black Sea Fleet is therefore highly indicative of Russia’s current priorities - although since the vessels are being built in the Yantar shipyard in Kaliningrad, their deployment to the Baltic Sea would be easy and prompt. Any such move should be viewed as a warning, as it would mark a significant change in posture and priorities. 

 

Concurrently, the ability of the Baltic Sea Fleet assets to sealift equipment and personnel is also limited. The 71st Landing Ship Brigade fields 14 landing vessels of various classes, which would struggle to independently lift the Baltiysk-based 336th Guards Marine Brigade, especially if the latter is at full strength including armour and personnel. As such, before conducting an amphibious landing in the Baltic Sea, Russia would need to significantly reinforce its naval components both with landing ships, and with main surface combatants to provide an escort capability to the landing force.

 

One of the most-cited potential conflict scenarios involves the deployment of elements of the 76^th Airborne Division, based in Pskov in the Leningrad Oblast, to Sweden’s Gotland Island in a move to dominate the central Baltic and present the Western world with a fait accompli. Indeed, in the past year or so there has been a notable growth in the number of exercises held in Kaliningrad involving elements from the 76^th Airborne Division and the 336^th Marine Brigade supported by air forces and naval fixed- and rotary-wing assets. The latter included Sukhoi Su-24s, Su-27s, and Su-34s. However, these exercises, albeit involving naval components, did not include the provision of the capability to escort amphibious ships.

 

Undoubtedly, Russia places high emphasis on interoperability levels between its most capable units, which are to form a first line of defence in case of an emergency. However, given the 76^th Division’s involvement in Ukraine, the unit is unlikely to offer a power-projection capability in the Baltic while its Ukrainian presence lasts.

 

Undeniably the pace of exercises and their scope has increased since early 2014. Russian defence media reported that the number of drills undertaken by Russian military in 2014 increased by 30% compared to the previous year.

 

However, in terms of overall naval power and readiness, Kaliningrad should be seen as still recovering from the collapse of its capabilities around the turn of the millennium. From 1990 to around 2000, it declined from a base capable of projecting substantial power to a base barely capable of local defence. The current pattern of exercises and acquisitions confirms that its deterrent and defensive capabilities have been materially improved, but a significant further investment in landing craft and surface escorts would be needed to restore the ability to project power far across the Baltic. Developments in these areas should be closely monitored as a gauge of the exclave’s offensive naval capability.

 

LAND FORCES

 

Alongside the naval units mentioned above, Kaliningrad is also home to a number of land combat units: the 79^th Guard Motorised Brigade, the 152^nd Missile Brigade, the 244^th Artillery Brigade and the 7^th Motor Rifle Regiment, together with the 336^th Marines Brigade and the 25^th Coastal Defence Regiment.

 

The marines are viewed as one of Russia’s elite forces and have been training intensively with the 76^th Parachute Brigade in Pskov (see below). The 152^nd brigade, meanwhile, is slated to upgrade its current Tochka-U missiles to the far more capable and headline-grabbing Iskanders by 2018, although significant questions remain (see below).

 

Relatively little is known of the state of readiness of the other units, either as regards their manning or their equipment holdings. Estimates of the numbers of tanks still present in the exclave vary widely; however, there is no image intelligence to suggest that there have been significant modernisations or increases in training patterns over the past 18 months, indicating that the holdings and associated forces are unlikely to be more effective than is the norm for Russian armoured forces.

 

Moreover, it should be noted that the current number of troops in Kaliningrad - 15,000 - indicates that some of the forces are significantly undermanned. Taken together, the four brigades at full establishment should muster some 12,000 troops. That leaves only 3,000 troops for the manning of the two regiments and the entire naval force, an unfeasibly small number.

 

While it is impossible to say definitively at this stage, it does not appear that the land-combat forces stationed in the exclave are at full strength, or at such a state of readiness that they would be capable of launching major action on the ground without significant training, maintenance and reinforcement.

 

AIR AND AIR DEFENCE

 

Russian aviation capabilities in the region centre around the 72nd Air Base, with squadrons based in Chkalovsk and Chernyakhovsk. Altogether this constitutes a force of around 28 Su-27 fighter aircraft and 24 Su-24M/Rs aircraft. There do not seem to be any immediate plans to augment the air force’s capabilities in the region, although by 2020 Russia plans to replace its Su-27s with Su-30SMs under SAP-2020. Thus far, the navy, which operates the bases in Kaliningrad, had received five aircraft of the type as of December 2015, and hopes to receive another 45 units before the end of the decade. 

 

As a result of Russia’s annexation of Crimea and increased regional tensions, NATO in April 2014 quadrupled the number of aircraft it deployed to the region and began operating from two new bases in Estonia and Poland. In response, Moscow sent six Su-27 'Flanker' fighters and a Beriev A-50 'Mainstay' airborne early warning platform to Baranovichi Air Base in Belarus.[30] This was followed by a deployment of MiG-31BM 'Foxhound' interceptor aircraft and Su-35s on Quick Reaction Alert (QRA) duties at airbases in the country's Western Military District.[31]

 

From the onset of the crisis NATO has been especially concerned with Russian aircraft transiting the Baltic region (usually from the St Petersburg area down to Kaliningrad, and vice-versa) without transponders, without filing flight plans, and doing so without interacting with civilian air traffic control (ATC).

 

The heightened posture on both sides led to a steep increase in intercepts of Russian aircraft by NATO aircraft, as shown by the following graph:

 

Safety Incidents and Border Violations of Estonian Air Space

 

1)     Cases when Russian Air Force aircraft turn off their transponders, do not present their flight plans or/and are not in radio contact with air traffic controllers (civilian).

2)     January-June 2015

 

Russian flyovers around the Baltic Sea fulfil a variety of missions. On the one hand, they improve pilots’ efficiency and test NATO’s radar and quick reaction alert capability. On the other hand, they exert political pressure on the Baltic States and fall within wider information campaigns aimed at sowing confusion as to the real goals of Russian policy and intentions.

 

However, it should also be noted that the pattern of interceptions by NATO’s air-policing craft has not been characterised by massive long-term increases. According to weekly figures published by the Lithuanian Defence Ministry beginning in November 2014, the spike in incidents in 2014 was followed by a relative lull in early 2015, with further spikes in March and July. [32]

 

Looking closely at the military air activity in over the Baltic, there appears to be a link between NATO manoeuvres in Eastern and Central Europe and an uptick in Russian Aerospace Defence Forces (VKO) activity. Indeed, some Russian flyovers were conducted directly in response to NATO drills in neighbouring countries such as Baltops and Saber Strike (both June). The higher profile the NATO exercise, the higher the number of Russian combat aircraft deployed to the Kaliningrad Oblast and thus the more threatening the posture presented. The most recent example of this trend occurred in late July when Russia sent 10 aircraft to Kaliningrad in a single sortie, at a time when NATO started its Rapid Trident exercise in Ukraine.[33] Prior to that, in April RAF Typhoons intercepted Russian Tu-95s[34] near British airspace as NATO was preparing to run the 'Joint Warrior' exercise off Scottish coast.[35] Similarly, exercise Sea Breeze 2015, held in the Black Sea in July, corresponded with Tu-22 flyovers in the Baltic and a spike in air activity. The large spike in VKO activity in March was largely driven by Russia’s own major snap exercise at that time,[36] but may also have been linked to the deployment of Standing NATO Maritime Group 2 to the Black Sea, an area of particular interest to Russian leaders.[37]

 

It should, however, be noted that with few exceptions largely linked to Russian exercises, the air movements have been on a small scale, with aircraft numbers typically in the single digits.  As such, they appear to function as a political signal rather than a sign of greatly improved capabilities. Put another way, if it is a case of muscle-flexing, the muscles are not very large.

 

Indeed, Moscow does not possess adequate resources to maintain a high operational tempo including dozens of flights per day, let alone dictating the pace in aerial operations. This has been shown by the spate of accidents between May and July 2015, when the VKO lost seven airframes. So many crashes of different types of aircraft could indicate that the VKO’s operational tempo is too high, and is thus unsustainable as long as the set of embargoes on the sale of military-use items to Russia from Ukraine is kept in place.

 

The impression of an air force which is operating at, or even beyond, its limits is reinforced by the status of the Russian presence in Belarus. In any conflict between Russia and the Baltic States, forces in Belarus would be a vital asset. However, at the date of writing (August 2015), Russian plans to deploy a squadron to its neighbour appeared to have stalled, with the Belarusian side showing no eagerness to conclude the deal quickly.[38] Thus, the Russian air presence in Belarus is limited to four fighter aircraft - hardly a major force.

 

One exception to this trend of relatively ageing capabilities is the deployment of S-400 anti-aircraft systems to the oblast. The S-400 is capable of protecting political, economic and militarily highly valuable areas from air strikes, strategic cruise, tactic and operative tactical ballistic missiles, and ballistic medium-range missiles at conditions of combat and electronic counter-measures. Deployed to Gvardeysk in early 2012, the system consists of two S-400 strategic SAM batteries alongside a battle management complex. Other identified defences in Kaliningrad Oblast include four S-300PS (SA-10B 'Grumble') strategic SAM sites, supported by a 5N64S ('Big Bird B') battle management radar, and 11 EW radar complexes. Strategic capabilities benefiting the Kaliningrad air-defence network as a whole involve the significant range advantages offered by S-400 system components. The S-400's 48N6DM missile possesses a 250 km range, greatly outperforming the S-300PS with its maximum range of 90 km. Surveillance capability is enhanced by the presence of the 91N6 battle management radar, which has a 600 km maximum range.[39]

 

Gvardeysk S-400 Complex

 

Source: IHS Jane’s /Airbus DS

Ranges

KEY  90 km (red) – S-300PS (5V55RD)  100 km (orange) – S-300V  250 km (yellow) – S-400 (48N6DM)  400 km (yellow) – S-400 (40N6)  165 km (blue) – 36D6  300 km (blue) – 5N64S, 96L6  400 km (light blue) – 55Zh6

 of various SAM and EW systems deployed in Kaliningrad Source: Google Earth 2014; data IHS Jane’s

 

 

The presence of the S-400 serves to deny close-in airspace, potentially forcing foreign support assets such as intelligence platforms and aerial refuellers to operate at a greater distance, affecting their usefulness. When fitted with the 400 km-range 40N6 missile, the S-400 batteries would be able to engage targets over portions of Belarus, Latvia, and Poland, and will cover the entirety of Lithuania, and would be able at extreme range to reach Gotland. While equipped solely with the 48N6DM, the batteries still remain effective over portions of Lithuania and Poland. The various missile ranges, coupled with the 92N6's multiple target engagement capability, allow the S-400 to engage targets at extreme ranges, freeing other assets such as S-300PS batteries to handle any targets that penetrate the outer reaches of S-400 coverage.[40]

 

Thus, in terms of air power, Kaliningrad has already undergone a significant capability improvement, and with the extreme range of the S-400, could contribute to the projection of power in the central Baltic. However, the lack of upgrades in other key capability areas, coupled with evident problems in maintaining the current tempo, would suggest that Russia currently lacks the assets and basing locations which would be the precursor to aggressive action in the Baltic arena.

 

THE ISKANDER QUESTION

 

What countries in the region are most concerned about are upgrades to be made to the 152^nd Guards Missile Brigade. At present, the brigade is equipped with OTR-21 Tochka-U short-range, ballistic missile. The missile is reported to be able to fly either ballistic or cruise flight profiles, the latter profile using wing lift and keeping the maximum altitude at around 30 km followed by a steep dive onto the target.

 

Tochka’s successor is, however, a completely different threat to address: The Iskander (SS-22 “Stone”) has a longer range, greater accuracy and a higher payload. More importantly, IHS Jane’s Strategic Weapon Systems reports that the missile can fly a depressed trajectory below 50 km altitude, and that the re-entry vehicle (RV) can make random evasive manoeuvres up to 30 g during the mid-course and terminal phases, to prevent interception by a SAM. It is also reported that the RV can be programmed to make a spiral trajectory in the terminal phase, with an optional steep descent onto the selected target.[41] The Iskander-M has been considered to have the potential to carry a tactical nuclear warhead.

 

Source: IHS Jane’s

 

Iskanders have not yet been permanently deployed to Kaliningrad: the question is so high-profile and so sensitive that it is likely to depend on political variables rather than purely military ones, and it has certainly been used for political ends hitherto.  Key variables in the timing are likely to include overall relations between Russia and the U.S., Polish procurement plans, missile defence developments and additional deployments of NATO and US equipment to Central and Eastern Europe. That said, in May, Major General Mikhail Matvievsky, chief of Strategic Missile Forces and the Artillery of the Russian Ground Forces, said that a missile brigade redeployed to the Kaliningrad region would be equipped with Iskander-M complexes before 2018. [42] Whether the deadline is kept, or is missed, as so many other deadlines have been, remains to be seen.

 

Regardless of Russia’s true intentions, the threat is being taken seriously. In March this year the US Army's Patriot-equipped Delta Battery from the 5th Battalion, 7th Air Defence Artillery Regiment was deployed to Poland for a week-long exercise held within the framework of Operation 'Atlantic Resolve'. Officially the drill focused on ‘testing the Patriot crew's proficiency as well as conducting movement drills that practise the quick emplacement of the air-defence systems’.[43] The US personnel, along with the Polish 3rd Warsaw Air Defence Brigade, tested the Patriot system in a dense combat environment. According to the scenario, a hypothetical country, 'Monda', attacked 'Wislandia' using ballistic missiles and airstrikes. (‘Wislandia’ is a thinly-disguised term for Poland based on the name of its chief river, the Vistula - in Polish, Wisła.)

 

The attack included up to 100 Iskander-M tactical ballistic missile strikes and up to 500 airstrikes. These attacks had been preceded by the use of the electromagnetic spectrum along the eastern and northern frontiers of 'Wislandia' (which corresponded to the Polish-Belarusian and Polish-Russian borders). One of the factors assessed by the Polish MoD during the procurement of its air- and missile-defence capability was how the system would perform against Iskander-Ms in a dense electronic warfare environment. Although it has not been officially confirmed, Raytheon's Patriot reportedly [44] performed better in these conditions than Eurosam's SAMP/T air-defence system - a fact apparently confirmed when Poland selected Patriot for acquisition on 21 April.[45] Nevertheless, Patriot managed to shoot down only 50% of incoming missiles.

 

Given the way the Kremlin has used the Iskander question as a tool for political leverage, any future decision to deploy Iskanders permanently to Kaliningrad would also be a highly political one. It is noteworthy that the deployments conducted to date have been temporary, publicly confirmed and announced as over as soon as the exercises were concluded. As such, the question of Iskander deployment seems likely to remain a key indicator of Russia’s intentions, and merits the closest observation.

 

INFRASTRUCTURE WORKS

 

There are at least four weapon storage areas (WSA) in the Kaliningrad Oblast where large quantities of equipment are kept. As such, some estimates suggest that the total number of MBTs in the Kaliningrad could reach as many as 800.[46]

 

Prokhladnoye WSA

 

Source: IHS Jane’s / Airbus DS

 

Imagery intelligence (IMINT) suggests that only one of those bases, Prokhladnoye, is presently undergoing modernisation. It is not clear whether the base is being expanded or simply being upgraded. Concurrently, Russia is modernising its Chkalovsk airbase, which involves replacing the surface of the base.

 

No engineering work has been recorded on storage areas belonging to the 152nd Guards Missile Brigade, which is likely to occur before the unit receives Iskander complexes.

 

Both works being done to the Prokhladnoye WSA and the Chkalovsk Air Base should be seen through the prism of other engineering projects being conducted in Russia’s Western Military District. In recent years Russia has been modernizing weapon storage areas and airbases in Western parts of the country, which had usually not seen any upgrades since the Cold War.

 

The pattern of construction work in the Kaliningrad region therefore appears to indicate a level of activity consistent with a long-term improvement of its facilities, but not with the preparation of an aggressive policy of power projection in the short term. Again, building works on military locations should be monitored closely as an indication of longer-term intentions, especially in the storage areas of the 152^nd Guards Missile Brigade. 

 

THE ROLE OF REINFORCEMENTS

 

Thus far, this study has looked at the forces in Kaliningrad in terms of their ability to project power in the Baltic. While that ability is growing, it is not yet enough to constitute a credible attacking force on its own. Therefore, as well as upgrading the facilities in the oblast if it were to plan an offensive action, Russia would most likely have to reinforce the troops, either in the exclave, or in Belarus and the Leningrad Oblast.

 

The case of Ukraine provides a useful example in this respect. As Russian forces were pouring into Crimea in March 2014, Moscow deployed between 40,000 and 80,000 personnel near Ukraine to serve as a deterrent against Ukrainian Armed Forces counteroffensive measures. If Russia were to harbour similar aggressive intentions in the Baltic basin, it is reasonable to assume that it would need to muster at least the same number of combat-ready personnel in Western parts of the country to deter counter-attacks.

 

No sign of such preparations has been seen either in Kaliningrad or the Leningrad Oblast. While Russia is attempting to reinforce its presence in Belarus, this is neither large-scale nor fast-moving. Moreover, large-scale preparations take time, do not occur in vacuum and are extremely hard to conceal from outside observers. Indeed, in a recent interview Gen Marek Tomaszycki, Commander-in-chief of the Polish Armed Forces, stated that Poland would be able to recognize the symptoms of an incoming large-scale conflict 180 to 360 days before an enemy obtained the capacity to strike.[47] Russia is presently far away from achieving this goal.

 

CONCLUSION

 

The main current role of the forward deployed Russian forces in the Kaliningrad Oblast is conventional deterrence. However, in the light of their size, equipment and capabilities, they only provide the minimally acceptable level of security for the exclave. After repeated rounds of troop reductions over the past two decades, the numerical strength of these forces has now been stabilized. Their fighting ability is on the rise thanks to the arrival of new vessels and weaponry, as well as a sharp increase in the intensity of combat training.

 

That said, there is no evidence of Russian troops in the Kaliningrad Oblast being unusually upgraded or augmented. New capabilities have not yet been added, although given Russia’s rhetoric toward NATO, one would expect this to have already taken place. With the notable exception of the S-400s, the equipment located in the oblast is still largely antiquated and of Soviet legacy.

 

As such, Kaliningrad can be viewed as an indicator of Russia’s actual capabilities and intentions, beyond the stridently bellicose rhetoric.

 

In particular, NATO and the countries of the Baltic region should maintain a careful watch for the following key developments:

 

Ø  Significant reinforcements to the Baltic Fleet’s sealift and landing capability

Ø  Significant increase in the number and quality of surface escorts (especially the transfer to the Baltic Fleet of combatants slated for the Northern and Black Sea fleets)

Ø  Significant enhancement of the Russian air forces in Belarus

Ø  Significant re-activation, modernisation or expansion of the tank forces in the exclave

Ø  Extension and modernisation of military bases and storage depots, especially those of the 152^nd Guards Missile Brigade

Ø  Deployment of Iskanders

 

Russia’s intentions in the Baltic arena are, and remain, opaque. However, its capabilities, and changes to those capabilities, give the clearest indication of what plans it might realistically be developing. As such, Kaliningrad is not only the key to the Baltic: it is a key to understanding the reality behind Russia’s warlike rhetoric.