“One may hope that America’s internal preoccupations will

   produce not an isolationist policy, which has become

   impossible, but a forbearance that will give other countries

   at long last the chance to deal with their own problems and

   make their own mistakes. But I would not bet on it.”

                                                                                                                                                                (Waltz, 1993)

INTRODUCTION

        Waltz’s structural realism theory explains all the tensions of the Middle East region; nothing else but a chaotic Middle East would befit to the current picture of it. Indeed after the Cold War, when the bipolar system ended and the Soviet Union collapsed, the Middle Eastern state actors in the temporary unipolar international system found themselves unrehearsed to ideas of the globalization.

       The aim of this paper is to find possible answers to the impact of post-Cold War international relations shift in and on the Middle East region. In the first part of the article, a short introduction of the Cold War period and policies of two superpowers from the frame of realist theory will be given, in particular from the perspective of Kenneth Waltz’s and John Mearsheimer’s Neorealist approach. I argue that their approach is an illustrative attempt to analyze even the post-Cold War impacts in the Middle East. These impacts began with the Washington’s “New World Order,” acting as a hegemon power and the failure, after the invasion of Iraq by the US-led coalition in 2003, continuing with recent disastrous attempts of regional powers to substitute the void created by reflux of the US. Subsequently, the second part of the article discusses the new Middle Eastern Cold War in order to gain control over the region and alliances and divisions among the state actors during this war. 

       The Cold War Era dominated international relations for about a half century. The superpowers did not confront directly on frontlines, but however in different parts of the world geography, with their auspices and paramilitary groups having caused conflicts and wars. The division in the Middle East region inevitably took part in this rivalry. After the Second World War, the Middle East became a ground for ideological confrontation of the Cold War. Since then, the region has been witnessing the clash of national interests, sectarian, tribal conflicts, and finally secular and religious revolutions. Anarchic feature of structural realism comes in sight at this stage, in particular in the example of Middle Eastern state systems, what Waltz argues is that they are alike having anarchic structures rather than hierarchical. Either by superpowers or regional actors, there has always been an attempt to take a control or be decisive in politics on the Middle East tinderbox. In this matter, aspects of the Cold War dimension for two superpowers (and same for the states of the region) were “strategic cross-currents” (Halliday, 2005, p.97). Halliday points out in his book that it was not straightforward as on other fronts of the blocs; rather, for example, the US had political and strategic interests in Israel, but for petroleum it closed on the Arab states. Beside this, local states did not play mere a secondary role, far from it; they had their own impact on superpower politics (Karsh, 1997, p.271). Even choosing one of the two global superpowers was due to their internal paradigms. For example, Iran before the Islamic Revolution (1979) was America’s foremost ally in the region, after which the revolution changed its politics precisely adverse sides. Another example is Egypt after the death of Nasser, which switched its orientation from the Soviet Union to a more Western one. That is also characteristic of Waltz’s Neorealist approach in a bipolar system, that the power over limited territory can be gained by one must be lost to other one (Jackson and Sørensen, 2007, p.32). For forty years following World War II, the international system was dominated by bipolar divisions of two models of political and economic development and examined by Realist and Neorealist theories (Murden, 2002; Selim, 2010).   

       For a better understanding of what direction and to what extent the Middle East has been impacted by the shift from the Cold War to the post-Cold War, one should study what the Cold War was meaning for the region itself. Karsh (p.274) claims that the influence of the superpowers was constrained and these local conflicts and reciprocal offensiveness were predated to the Cold War influence. Namely, Six-Day War (1967) was launched by Israel without the opinion of the US and the October War (1973), the Syrian military invasion of Lebanon (1976), the Iraqi invasion of Iran (1980) were committed without fiat of the Soviet Union. What does all this mean? It means that both in the Cold War period and after the Cold War the superpowers’ influence was limited to certain extend in the Middle East. Karsh points out that “[h]ad it not been for the active support of the main Arab states and Saudi Arabia’s consent to use its territory as the springboard for a military action against Iraq, the United States would never have been able to orchestrate the anti-Iraq coalition, let alone muster the political clout to wage war. Much as the Arabs needed American help to remove a lethal regional threat, the United States needed the Arabs to secure its political and economic interests” (Karsh,1997, p.288).

ANARCHY AND THE MIDDLE EAST; A NEO-REALIST APPROACH

        Chaos and anarchy are main subjects of Neorealist thinking, according to Waltz (2010). He goes even further and claims that there is nothing to do with human nature or ethics of statecraft (Jackson and Sørensen, 2007, p.75), but it is rather about power and it always looks for a spot to come out (Pashakhanlou, 2014). In the Middle East there has been always a chaos of the power. As Waltz assumes that states are always looking for capabilities to take care of themselves, relevant cases occurred on the stage of Middle East politics. Although Waltz’s Neorealist approach was analyzing the bipolar system and its accordance for international order, Mearsheimer’s offensive Realism assumes “that the international system is anarchic where survival is the main objective of states” (Palgrave). Mearsheimer’s offensive realism in a local context perfectly explains the power competition in the Middle Eastern sand. Mearsheimer lists five components of that course of survival:

1.     There is no world government.

2.     All states are capable of using force against other states.

3.     No state can ever be certain that another state will not use force against it.

4.     All states seek to maintain their territorial integrity and domestic autonomy.

5.     States are rational actors. (R. Harrison Wagner, 2007, p. 13)

    Mearsheimer elaborates his thesis that under normal circumstances all states have an obvious intention to survive, however when these five assumptions combine in extraordinary situations, they think and act offensively with regard to each other. 

    The Arab Spring and the battle in Syria escalated regional rivalry among key regional players as a solid pattern of the realism theory. If even states do not act offensively as Mearsheimer points out, which is also in disagreement with some realists who assume that the nature of international politics forces all states to focus on their own independence and survival from defensive perspective. For instance As Waltz assumes that the balance of power is an “iron law” as states instinctively seek to secure their safety in order to make sure that none of their rivals grows too powerful (Pashakhanlou, 2014). The current political uprisings and changes in the Middle East made those states to act in a way to keep their regional rivalry and secure their national interests in other countries, in this case in Egypt, in Libya and/or in Syria by using their auspices and paramilitary groups.

       As Malcolm Kerr observed the politics of the Middle East in 1965, there was a sub-feature of the global Cold War in the region, which he examined under the terms of an “Arab Cold War”. Turner assumes that “the Arab cold war … was not exclusively an extension of superpower rivalries” (2012, p.125). It had obviously some links with the global Cold War, but it was based on the historical recollection. Rashid Khalidi (2009, p.18) assesses this first local Cold War as poles of Saudi Arabia and Egypt who came to be closely aligned with the US and the Soviet Union. However this division did not continue always like this. Egypt shifted its regional politics toward Israel in Sadat’s presidency and order of departure of Soviet units placed in Egypt (Karsh, p.275).

      The second Arab Cold War, I would rather name it as a Middle Easter Cold War for Shia-Sunni antagonism between Saudi Arabia and Iran, along with their allies, started after the Islamic Revolution in 1979. In this rivalry, there were two competing alignments, the revolutionary bloc (Iran, Syria and Hezbollah) and the status quo bloc (Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Qatar). Geopolitical interests of Iran and Saudi Arabia confront them as rivals that put them in an aggressive competition to preserve and expand their power in the region (Turner, p.124).

POST-COLD WAR AND THE MIDDLE EAST IN THE REGIONAL COLD WAR

     The post-Cold War era did not come with liberal politics and economics of Western-centric globalization, one would assume that since the Soviet Union collapsed and the Cold War ended. However, hostile stands of regional powers remained unchanged. The US continued to play its role of security guarantor in the region’s disputes, such as the Arab-Israeli dispute and the Sunni state-Iran confrontation (Russell, 2014). The second Gulf War and economic globalization brought a delusion of the New World Order in which the struggle for power would be superseded by the features of the pluralist model – complex interdependence, democratic peace. However, the new era was also confronted with challenges in features of local cultures, especially in the form nationalism and religion   (Murden, p.23). Hinnebusch describes this period of post-Cold War transition in the Middle East as:

Many regional states sought to use, evade or appease American power but, given the weakness of the region, it was perhaps inevitable that actual resistance would chiefly take a non-state form. The September 11, 2001 attack by Islamist terrorists on the very heart of America led the US into its second Middle East war in a decade. At the end of 2001, the region, far from entering the “zone of peace”, was at risk of becoming the arena for a “clash of civilizations” (pp.204-205). 

      Islam became a main paradigm of the seminal post-Cold War resistance against western culture and different sectarians of it for defining regional politics, which is also studied by in works of Francis Fukuyama, Samuel Huntington, and Benjamin Barber (Murden, p.12.) The politics of the Middle Eastern countries have always been influenced by a variety of factors. Arab nationalism, Islamic sectarianism, imperialism and ethnic conflicts incited a post-Cold War confrontation, a new Middle Eastern Cold War in the region.

      The New Middle Eastern Cold War intensified with the toppling of Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein and further escalated after the president election in Iran in 2005. Valbjorn and Bank argue that super powers are not attempting to provoke regional rivalry to gain a control. It is rather manipulated by the competing powers of the region due to regional adversaries (Turner, p.124) As Pierre Guerlain (Turner, p.124) asserts, “Client states and their leaders always exploit their relationships with their powerful allies to achieve their own goals.” The new tension of the Middle Eastern Cold War has been escalated by the events of Arab Springs. Ryan argues that the recent regional Cold War predate the Arab uprisings of 2011-2012, first signs came in sight during the 2006 war between Israel and Hizballah (MER 262, 2012.) Ryan compares the first Arab Cold War with the most recent one; what he comes up with is interesting. He states that many of the elements are similar as power struggles, ideological and identity conflicts, and proxy wars are present today as well. The most crucial concept asserted by Bank and Valbjørn is that the recent confrontation is not just about inter-state relations, further it is a shift within the meaning of Pan-Arabism, a fracture between state and society:

A societal Political Arabism rising from an Arab-Islamic public rather than a state-led Pan-Arabism constitutes a dominant frame of reference in Middle East regional politics today. Societal actors, not upstart republics, now represent the challenge to the regional status quo. The rivalry is also no longer primarily an inter-state competition, but a cold war between Arab regimes and societal actors led by Islamists with considerable popular support and subscribing to a popularly driven Islamic Political Arabism. (Ryan, 2012)

      The recent Arab uprisings in Egypt and Syria and the failed and incompetent invasion of the US-led coalition, which dislocated the stones and led to the vacuum in weakened Iraq, have advanced some other regional actors, especially Arab Gulf states. Watanabe underlines the US’ reluctance in the region created actively a ground for regional powers as well (2014). There is especially a big competition between Saudi Arabia and Qatar on gaining the control over regional politics. When Qatar was a meditator on Gaza dispute (January, 2009), the Saudi Kingdom refused to attend in Doha. Also, both peninsula monarchies aid other neighboring states and even non-state actors.

      Doha stands in the region to support the transitions, recently while the Arab Spring led the government and the Qatar-owned Al Jazeera network to stand-by demonstrations against long period ruled regimes in Egypt, Tunisia. Doha’s geostrategic interests generated the support from the Muslim Brotherhood and this decision deepened the cold ties with Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Bahrain. On March 5, three countries’ joint announcement released that they call back their ambassadors to Doha (Dickinson, 2014). Qatar supported the Free Syrian Army against the al-Assad regime, and moreover, has been hosting the Syrian National Council. The main point here was to promote the Muslim Brotherhood within the opposition group (Watanabe, 2014). Qatar's backing of the Muslim Brotherhood has been perceived by Saudi Arabia and the UAE as a shattering threat in the Gulf's ruling monarchies. According to Dickenson (2014), “[b]oth countries, as well as Kuwait, have rushed to aid the post-Brotherhood Egypt, offering a combined $12 billion in aid to the new military-backed government. At home, the UAE has brought dozens of alleged Brotherhood members to trial, including Emirati, Qatari, and Egyptian citizens.”

      The US allies in the Gulf region reflect a deep concern about Washington’s rapprochement on Iran’s nuclear program, in particular with Saudi Arabia. Wehrey and Sadjapour (2014) acknowledge that since there is not bilateral relationship in the Middle East and also changing politics of the US on Middle East, especially with Iran it is a tough task for Washington to bring stability and reconcile to two ethnic, political and sectarian rivalries of the region. Their radical politics always challenge America’s presence in the region. The failures of American leadership in regional politics turned to the conclusion that Washington's regional allies are essentially on their own, and, for this reason, it is their moment to shape the Middle East to their own specific geopolitical needs and benefits. Both Qatar and the UAE are US allies in the Gulf region, having formed close relations with the US following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990. However, when it is about regional interests, all countries, including Qatari and Emirati, ruling elites as well are increasingly concerned about whether they can rely on continued US commitment to Gulf security (Watanabe, 2014). The recent parliament election in Tunisia was set against Qatar and the UAE over their fundamental aspects of Arab Spring uprisings. In this new Middle Eastern Cold War they use their proxies, like Qatar’s partner Ennahda or the Emirati’s partner Nidaa. Qatar-based media outlets invite Ennahda politicians to programs that launch news from Doha’s and its partner’s perspective. In these cold rivalry monarchies like Saudi Arabia, the UAE conducts counterrevolutionary policies.  Before the Arab Spring, the main self-defense priority of the Gulf States was a unity against Iran influence; nonetheless it has been changed since then to protect their own dynasties.

     Destruction of Iraqi military power increased the military and political influence of Iran in the region. Iran is seeking to spread its revolutionary politics through the neighboring states. After the toppling of Saddam Hussein, Tehran improved its relations with Iraqi government.  Interestingly, Waltz as writing in Foreign Affairs argued that in the region Iran should have a nuclear weapon to stabilize the power balance. In current Syrian crisis Iran is backing its foremost ally Assad to stay in power, which by Qatar and Saudi Arabia is aiming to oust Assad’s Alawi minority ruling with obedient Sunni government. Syria for Iran is the last fortress in the region; hence Tehran gives much weight to keep the Assad regime in the power (Wehrey and Sadjapour, 2014).

     “An undeclared war within Islam” (Crittenden, 2012) in Syria is the peak point of the New Middle Eastern Cold War.  This is probably the only battleground for all regional state or non-state actors to take a part in. Therefore, it cannot be only assumed as religious hatred between Shia and Sunnis, but in broader context as more geopolitical. Some authors assess this fight in Iraq, Syria, Egypt among Turkey, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Iran and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in order to establish themselves as regional leaders (Cook, Stokes and Brock, 2014). While fighting for their national interests against each other, they also look for new cooperation. The Arab League, the Gulf Co-operation Council seek a new unity to counter Iranian influence in the region. However, these regional organizations according to some authors represent “failed” ones. This “failure” is not only about preventing or mediating regional conflicts (Pinfari, 2009, p.1), but also darkening political and military antagonism in the region. Perhaps another reason behind all this instability is absence of an actual economic cooperation between regional states, not only among Arab states. According to liberal theory in international relations, trade liberalization and economic cooperation are main pillars for promoting peace and political stability. As a result, a majority of the countries are involved in the producing oil, which makes them not economically interdependent on one another. Thus, the absence of trade exchange has increased instability in the region (Copeland, 1996, p. 6-8).

CONCLUSION

       In this paper it has attempted to answer possibly to the question of post-Cold War impacts in the Middle East. Applying Kenneth Waltz’s neorealist approach to and analyzing watershed cases since 1990’s, it has attempted to clarify manner of the regional actors. It is hard to follow each country’s policies; therefore the main focus was particularly on key players as Iran, Saudi Arabia and Qatar. Malcolm Kerr’s sub-featured Middle Eastern Cold War for regional confrontation was the most applicable answer about possible impact in the Middle East today. It is believed that there is another (third) Middle Eastern Cold War (Arab Cold War) among regional competitors.  As always the main breaking point is between Shia-Sunni parties, but especially taking into account the battle in Syria, it is much more complex than simple religious animosity. During and after the Arab Spring uprisings Qatar and Iran have been interested in regime changes, while other oil-rich monarchies were trying to preserve status quo. However once the uprising bounced in Syria, Iran’s manner has changed. All regional key players support their proxy partners with financial aid and fuel. Consequently the Arab Spring uprisings deepened division among regional rivalries. Seemingly the new Middle Eastern Cold War will not end soon. Islamic extremism on one side and refugee problem (9 million people internally or externally displaced during the battle in Syria) on the side are outcomes of the greater Middle East to be involved in. For this reason the super powers of the multipolar system may find themselves in a deadlock to find a way out of it.  In substance there will be blood-soaked soil and mountainous refugee problem for the West and the US to deal with.