Introduction

During the last decades the focus of the international community shifted from Europe to Asia and the number of emerging new actors participating in shaping the world order increased exponentially. Moreover, the relative power of Europe declined significantly and the rise of China, coupled with the re-emerging threat represented by Russia, the spread of ISIS and the ongoing migrant crisis deeply undermine the European influence in the world. These challenges represent a fertile terrain for Europe to demonstrate its values, its integrity and re-elaborate its shortsighted policies into more effective strategies. The European Union is currently facing hurdles that also embody big opportunities to grow, which may enable it to take on the responsibilities that the EU as a world power ought to take care of.

So what role does the EU have in this New World Order?

Europe as a Security Provider

The European Union is a sui generis actor being at the same time a civil, military and economic regional organization. Unlike NATO, EU’s special traits allow member states to employ different instruments to operate at the world scale. One of EU’s strong points is indeed the capability to deploy civil-military missions that can provide assistance, humanitarian aid, training, advice and support to security reforms with civil and military personnel. The EU is currently running five military and eleven civilian missions, completing seventeen operations over the last twelve years. In fact, NATO deployed its first civilian mission only on the 1^st January 2015 – the Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan – while the EU has a long history of experience in this field.

The variety of European missions, often responding to different issues with a comprehensive approach, reflects the EU’s huge capability to enable involvement by actors beyond the military sector. Sure enough, the EU preferred to engage in on the ground tailored niche peacekeeping missions, which are limited in time, space and scope, as the operations in Africa highlight. Some exceptions are Op. Atalanta offshore Somalia and Op. Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina

Concerning crisis management operations, the EU has opted for a contributory or facilitating role in cooperation with UN peacekeeping missions. The EU-UN Co-operation in Military Crisis Management Operations Elements of Implementation of the EU-UN Joint Declaration, adopted by the European Council on 17-18 June 2004, in Brussels, described five deployment scenarios of cooperation between the EU and the UN, among which only the last two approaches were principally used: the bridging model and the standby model. These two deployment scenarios reflect, in fact, the EU’s preference for short-term engagements with clear exit options. In peacekeeping missions, the EU fills the functional niches or gaps of the partner organization, such as NATO or UN. For instance regarding the EU partnership with NATO, thanks to the mechanism created by the Berlin Plus Arrangements, the EU is able to efficiently cooperate with NATO and to have access to NATO’s planning capabilities and common assets for actual use in a EU-led crisis management operation. In several occasions, the EU and NATO succeeded in collaborating on the ground, overcoming initial communication and coordination difficulties, such as in offshore Somalia between the EU Operation Atalanta and NATO Operation Ocean Shield, in Afghanistan between EUPOL and ISAF and also in Kosovo between EULEX and NATO KFOR. Notwithstanding the coordination and decision-making problems that the EU-NATO strategic partnership could have due to the Turkey-Cyprus impasse, they have never hindered the deployment of a mission from both organizations. Sure enough, the cooperation is currently at a sub-optimal state, and could be easily improved if the EU member states demonstrate a strong willingness to do so. However, the EU proved to be able to operate at global level with efficient and effective measures, without overlaying with other international actors but cooperating with them in a constructive manner.

            As the EU’s military history highlights, since the Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of Congo in 2003, EU missions abroad increased in numbers and the EU member states tried to develop a rapid response force to deal with peacekeeping missions, emulating the success obtained by the previous experience with Artemis: the European Battlegroup (EU BG). In 2007 the EU Battlegroup concept reached Full Operational Capability, but since then, even if a BG-sized force was recognized as a crucial military tool that could make the difference in the initial stage of a crisis response, the EU BGs have never been deployed. The EU is losing the chance to show to the whole world that it could still cover an important role as a conflict-manager actor. The EU BG concept is a tool to project EU military strength abroad and if not employed in any military operation its purpose and role will likely fade away. It will miss the opportunity to be the driver of the EU defense transformation, undermining the EU’s credibility and effectiveness as a world power. Here again, the problem lies with the willingness of the EU member state in charge to use BGs despite the high cost of the deployment. How could Sweden – in charge of the BG from January to June 2015 – decide to deploy the EU BGs abroad when the Russian military is very active in the Baltic Sea?

A comprehensive and united European approach?

After the signature of the Lisbon Treaty, the comprehensive approach should have driven the external actions of the EU to be more inclusive, multilateral and coherent. Since then the EU developed a broader spectrum of instruments to deal with great diversity of security threats inextricably intertwined between them, as its is shown in the case in the Horn of Africa, where the operations EUCAP Nestor, EUTM Somalia and EUNAVFOR Atlanta were deployed. The problem lies when the comprehensive approach should be implemented in the EU’s comprehensive action on the ground. In order to be an international security provider, the EU should strengthen its framework of inter-institutional cooperation, enhancing the cooperation between all relevant actors part of the decision-making process in the EEAS and enabling a credible military force. The comprehensive approach adopted during the abovementioned missions enabled the civil-military operations to be long-standing and to provide more efficient solutions with long-term goals and stability in the involved country.

Addressing crisis by acting on their root causes in order to prevent them from happening or from escalating in the future is the strategic thinking and action the EU should adopt. The core solution is to think together, to act as one and to have a real common voice and common strategy. The new Global Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy will be released in 2016 and “it will not be a real strategy if it won't be common, if it won't be European”. It is for the same reason, and to avoid those scenarios such as the Ukrainian crisis, that the EU Commission President Jean-Claude Junker talked about a common EU army. A Joint European army will improve the credibility of European security and defense and will be an effective deterrent to mitigate Russia’s ambitions in Eastern Europe. Even if the creation of an European army will be possible only in the very long term, it is since the 3Ds statement of the U.S. Secretary of State, Madeline Albright, on 7 December 1998 that the U.S., the largest of our NATO allies, has allowed and encouraged the EU to be more active in its Foreign and Security Policy and to invest more in its defense, with the only requirement of avoiding decoupling, duplication and discrimination. Unfortunately, at present the European army can be only an ambitious dream, because there are currently other policy priorities for enhancing the role of the EU in the world. Developing a real common policy and creating the political will to achieve that dream should be the main priority. The EU member states should accept to surrender part of their sovereignty to build a more coherent and united common foreign policy, and only after that and after easing the decision making process to rapidly operate at the international level, the EU could start talking about a integrated European army. The EU should first optimize its use of Pooling Sharing (P&S) in order to foster cooperation among member states, reduce the duplication of efforts and expenses and enhance the coordination and capabilities, without using P&S as a mere pretext to further lower the defense budget.

European member states have been decreasing their defense spending in recent decades and nowadays it has gone down by 28 percent since the Cold War era. This attitude engendered a growing dependence on the United States as a security provider for European defense in a situation where the U.S. military is looking more and more at the Pacific. Only four EU member states are expected to meet the 2 percent target for defense spending in 2015 (Estonia, Greece, Poland and United Kingdom). While the 2 percent is only a political target to motivate NATO member states – Europeans in particular – to rely less on the U.S. and more on themselves, it will incite Europeans to engage in more and smarter defense spending, more burden-sharing and increase commitment by the reluctant nations. European countries should be responsible for their defense and take on the challenges that Russia poses to EU’s Eastern border, where a security vacuum lies and NATO troops cannot be permanently stationed. Even if the 2 percent target could be considered a mere distraction from NATO and Europe’s real security problems – the lack of a shared threat assessment and the slow decision-making process among many others – it works as a political and evaluating tool to measure the commitment of states to their own security. Unfortunately several states seem to be reluctant to increase their defense spending in the short-term, even the ones that are the most affected by Russia’s threat. In the Baltic States only Estonia is expected to meet the 2 percent target in 2015 and Latvia is the only country without a compulsory military service. They are lacking the military means to have a credible conventional deterrence, and should invest more in their defense. The return of the compulsory military service in Latvia during this time of security uneasiness should be considered. It is also important to improve the regional cooperation and defense between Baltic and Nordic states, which are the most exposed to an eventual Russian aggression. The feeling of insecurity is what should motivate threatened states to act and stick together. Indeed, the three Baltic States should implement the principle of collective defense at regional level to show the same sense of unity and freedom that they demonstrated on the 23^rd of August 1989 with the Baltic Way. The EU could fill the security and defense gap that NATO, on the basis of the NATO-Russia Founding Act, cannot cover. Furthermore, the EU should tackle the energy security of the Eastern countries to reduce Baltic – but also the other European – States’ energy dependence on Russia, lowering its strong leverage on these countries.

According to the NATO-Russia Founding Act signed in 1997 in Paris, NATO agreed to not increase the number of permanently stationed combat forces. Therefore the former Warsaw Pact countries could only rely on the temporary presence of NATO troops to ensure their safety. Some experts contest this claim, quoting the IV paragraph of the Act that states “in the current and foreseeable security environment”. Given the substantial change of the context, and the fact that NATO enlargement started before the signature of this Act, the stationing of permanent military forces on the ground in the Eastern countries is in line with the pledge made to Russia. The only implicit risk behind this move is that it could be used by Russian propagandists to reinforce the mythical provocation that NATO constitutes a threat to Russia. In order to avoid the latter scenario, the EU could fill this security vacuum in close cooperation with NATO and the Eastern countries.

The threats surrounding Europe

Russia’s aggression towards Ukraine gave a terrible blow to the international order. It is the first time since the end of the Cold War that the world system and principles are at risk. Russia’s neo-imperialist move in Ukraine created a precedent, which if not “resolved” with adequate responses by the international community and Western countries could encourage other countries to emulate it. It is evident that the war is back at Europe’s border and if the EU does not act together to face this challenge, its credibility will vanish. The EU has to act with decisiveness because not only Ukraine is at stake, but the European peace and prosperity as well. In order to build a proper strategic response, the EU needs to know what it is facing and what this threat actually consists of. The European states and people are so used to peace that are not able to recognize a threat even when it is evident as in the Ukrainian conflict. Quoting Sir Robert Cooper, ex European External Action Service (EEAS) Counselor and ex Special Advisor at the European Commission (EC), “What frightens me in Europe, it is the absence of fear [for Russia]”.

The annexation of Crimea, which flagrantly broke the principles of international law, was possible only because Russia had the opportunity to take advantage of European disunity. The political fragmentation and diverging strategic views made the EU vulnerable to asymmetric warfare. Putin’s new military strategy consists of a mix of Carl Von Clausewitz consideration of war as “[…] a continuation of political intercourse, a carrying out of the same by other means […]” and Sun Tzu’s idea that “warfare is the art of deceit. […] Attack where he (the enemy) is not prepared; go by way of places where it would never occur to him you would go.” Russia’s strategy aims to exploit the EU’s unpreparedness to fight against an unconventional enemy, which avoids a direct military confrontation. Putting together guerrilla and nonmilitary tools, Putin’s main objective is to destabilize the West, striking at its foundations: the legitimacy of the state and the EU as democratic institutions. The rise of Euroscepticism and the increasing popularity of nationalist parties are signals that this strategy is working and it is effectively weakening the geopolitical influence of Europe. It dents the clout of the EU’s soft power, which still is the main foreign policy tool that grants to the EU to maintain its status among the current great powers. In order to counter Russian strategy, the EU has to encourage political convergence towards common security interests. The EU needs to fight back against Russian propaganda with more neutral information and transparency. The EU should also encourage its member states to sit together and establish a common understanding of the main shared threats to European security and defense, and develop a common strategic response. Sad but true, the current internal political fragmentation is jeopardizing the European Security system and proved that the 1990s assumption that security in the EU is indivisible is false – even if it should be. The EU member states tend to focus on their own regional threats with prevailing national approaches rather than using a united European strategy. In addition, the EU is becoming more and more focused on domestic policies and problems, overlooking external challenges. The euro currency crisis and the fear of the “Grexit” took the main spots in the EU agenda. The EU definitely underestimated the potential threats at its doors. It is also true that the EU, as a sui generis actor, substantially improves and evolves only by reaction and in fact the current situation is the proof that the EU needs a crisis to grow. Russia is not the only challenge for European stability and security, because also ISIS constitutes a danger to the Western concept of statehood. The destabilization in the Southern Neighbourhood deeply affects European security. The growing instability in Syria and Iraq, for instance, escalated the migration crisis and the concerns over the “foreign fighters” dilemma. The incapacity to deal efficiently and rapidly with the thousands of migrants at the doors of the EU reflects the inability to act with a common and coherent strategy. As the President of the Alliance of Democrats and Liberal for Europe (ALDE) in the European Parliament, Guy Verhofstadt, said during the State of the Union address “this is not a European crisis. This is a "lack of European Union crisis”. The EU should stop on focusing only on reaction and should start to act.

Steps to be taken into consideration to increase European Security

In light of recent events, the European Union should rethink its European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). The ENP does not make clear distinctions among partners from different regions, and putting the Eastern Neighbourhood and the Southern Neighbourhood together in the same framework does not work. The EU should use a more realistic approach to deal with its neighbourhood and beyond. Maintaining stability should be the main concern, and increasing the economic ties the second one. Indeed, the ENP should be reformed according to the neighborhood the EU is dealing with. The EU should thus support democratic reform only in those countries that really want it – such as Georgia or Burma. Furthermore, the EU should use a more realistic approach: focusing on protecting European security and economic interests while criticizing human rights abuses and being ready for democratic reform in the longer term. Therefore, the conditionality of access has reached its limits and should be reconsidered. What is needed is a better understanding of an alternative incentive system for third countries, such as Russia, whilst including conflict prevention in the action plans should also be considered. The fragile European neighborhood is characterized by crossborder security challenges, such as terrorism and cyber-security, and by weak governance. A priority for the EU is to focus on state building in the area, in accordance with the principle of sovereignty, and accurately selecting the states that deserve the EU assistance. We have always to keep in mind that the ENP is one of the EU’s fundamental foreign policy tools and that it is fundamental encourage legal and democratic reforms to bring partner countries closer to EU standards. Indeed, the strongest and the most effective of all the EU’s instruments is its “power of attraction”. The EU’s ability to project its core values in neighboring countries and partners, and to lead them in using these same values to cooperate with EU is one of the most efficient instruments of EU Foreign Policy. Enlargement, European Neighbourhood policy and regional partnership significantly contribute to projecting the EU’s rule-of-law power abroad. Keeping “the EU doors open” encourages neighbour countries to adopt these rules, becoming closer and closer to the EU. These policies thus largely contribute to promote stability and prosperity in the region. The EU should keep on using these methods – with some improvements – to involve more and more partner states into understanding and adopting the same democratic standards and values. Joseph Nye recognized that the European power of attraction is the strongest form of soft power that the EU has at its disposal. To what extend it will be effective on a wide range of international issues will depend on the EU member states’ political will to speak with one voice.

Sanctions are another tool at the disposal of the EU. While heavily criticized by many, the use of sanctions strongly contributes to accomplish the EU’s aims. The outcomes of sanctions should not be evaluated only on a pain-gain basis, but by using different parameters such as their capacity to coerce, constrain and signal the targeted country. The pain-gain approach overestimates both the behavior change and the economic cost of the subject. They should be evaluated according to their ability to influence a specific target in a specific context. The sanctions are designed as a complementary tool to be used in coordination with other political, economic and military instruments. For this reason, the EEAS should be the institution in charge of their use rather than the Council. After the Lisbon Treaty, member states gained the implementing power that should belong to the Commission. Only with more cooperation between member states the sanctions could be used as a significant device in foreign policy. In fact, the EU can employ sanctions autonomously, out of the UN umbrella. Usually, the EU does not use this kind of approach on its own but with other states or regional organization such as the African Union or the U.S. However, compared to the latter, the EU is ready to ease the sanctions when the target shows credible signs of compliance. Sure enough, this important tool for a multilateral approach in foreign policy provoked hostile reactions among the international community, in particular by countries such as Russia and China, in the so-called “floor vs ceiling” debate.

            Finally, the foundation of the role of the EU in the current world order lies on its own citizenry. In order to be a credible actor on the international sphere, the EU needs a strong support from its own population. Just as with NATO’s Public Diplomacy, also the EEAS should aim to make national public opinion understand that the end of the Cold War does not mean the end for European defence, even more if we consider the recent invasion of Ukraine national sovereignty by Russia. Reinvigorating and fostering national public support is vital for the image of both NATO and the EU, in particular in a world where threats transcend borders and affect both the society and the individual. The EU security should not be underestimated. The role of media and public diplomacy is fundamental to keep the attention on the importance of European security as a whole, while preventing strong national interests to emerge and to negatively affect the European defense system.

Conclusions

Today the EU operates in a complete different context with respect to the previous decade, and the EU has to shape its own foreign policy understanding the threats hidden in the surrounding environment. While defining the EU Global Strategy, European leaders have to take into consideration that the old maxim of Lord General Hastings Ismay, first Secretary General of NATO, used to describe the current Europe should be rephrased as “The US are going OUT, Germany is IN, and Russia is UP”. Keeping this in mind, it appears evident that nowadays there is even more need for a stronger and united Europe in the context of Security and Defense.