Tout est bien qui finit bien as the French saying goes - All is well that ends well. This perfectly sums up the drama that unfolded in France surrounding the planned, and eventually cancelled, sale of two Mistral-class amphibious assault ships to Russia. The announcement by the French President, François Hollande, on September 23^rd that the two ships would be sold to Egypt – not Russia - marked the end of a tense period for French diplomacy, a time where every diplomatic move was watched closely not only by its NATO partners, but also by the Russians themselves.

The implications of the sale to Russia quickly went beyond that of a simple commercial transaction and took on heavy implications regarding Allied solidarity, continued pressure – if not coercion - on Russia and France’s key role in the resolution of a global crisis. These three aspects were all at the heart of the French necessary backtracking on the sale; however, the process did not go down without obstacles, and the public diplomacy surrounding the treatment of the affair proved to be an interesting example of how the West needs to control the narrative of such issues, at the risk of leaving Russia the opportunity to do so, and in the process create divides in public opinion, an aspect that was prevalent in France, and slowed down the political resolution of the crisis.

The military implications of the proposed sale of the Mistral ships to Russia were, in the first place, not to be underestimated, and caused understandable nervousness in the United States, Poland, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia, who all protested in one way or another for France to reconsider the sale. While the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Russia, General Nikolai Makarov, originally claimed in December 2010 that the two ships would be deployed to Russia’s Pacific fleet, this did little to reassure the Allies and partners who were rattled by, among other issues, a statement purported to have been made by Russian Navy Chief of Staff: had Russia possessed such capabilities in 2008, the alleged quote goes, it could have won the war against Georgia in “40 minutes instead of 26 hours”. Knowing the importance of the events in Georgia in Russia’s assessment of the “weaknesses” and lack of resolve of the West and, with in the background, the completed takeover of Crimea in a mere 48 hours, the optics of the sale were terrible for France, and added extra elements of concern in the balance of alarmed Allies. Therefore, the rationale for cancelling the sale was twofold: both to provide a boost of reassurance to the Eastern flank of the Alliance and to signal to Russia that such blatant defiance of international law would not go unanswered. Depriving Russia of a tool of power projection, albeit minor in the wider scale of its capabilities, served as a powerful symbol of solidarity, but begs the question of why the sale agreement was even struck in the first place.

President Sarkozy’s power play

The sale is the result of three distinct elements that guided French decision-making at the time when the deal was made, starting from negotiations in 2009 to the official signing of the deal in January 2011.

First of all, Nicolas Sarkozy, then French President, maintained a positive, if not friendly, relationship with his Russian counterpart Dimitri Medvedev.  The two men directly dealt with one another in 2008 during the Georgian crisis, where the former played the role of peace broker between Russia and Georgia. A few months later, Sarkozy would proclaim at the European-Russian Summit that “Russia and Europe have a mutual interest in working together”, just about a year after criticizing his predecessor Jacques Chirac for having “shook hands” with Vladimir Putin and presented Russia as a country “that complicates, rather than facilitates, global problems”. In 2010, during Medvedev’s visit of Paris, Sarkozy would state in broad terms the support of France for Russia’s ongoing modernization and reform process, highlighting the importance of a renewed “strategic partnership” between France and Russia. Sarkozy’s fixation on making Russia a trustworthy partner and a responsible stakeholder, or even his desire to change Russia in resembled, at times, a project borne of his hubris, and also represents a long-standing French tradition (since the presidency of General de Gaulle) to balance out the United States and Russia in order to preserve French “strategic autonomy” (l’autonomie stratégique), a key concept of French security policy. With George W. Bush on his way out in August 2008, Sarkozy saw an opportunity to enhance France’s standing on the international field by playing a central role in the resolution of a crisis in the European neighborhood. The sale of the Mistral ships are part and parcel of this long term plan, and also ticks two other boxes that were of particular importance to Nicolas Sarkozy at the moment, and that led to the difficulty of France’s backtracking on the eventual delivery of the ships.

In a second place, Sarkozy was under increasing pressure from French defense industrialists to boost France’s image as an exporter, as the first years of his presidency were not crowned with success on this front. The President had a real incentive to obtain a major contract for one of the many French companies. Finally, in a third place, the shipyard in Saint-Nazaire, where the two Mistrals ships were assembled, is one of the crown jewels of the French defense industrial complex, and was at that time under severe threat of facing bankruptcy due to a lack of incoming contracts. The symbol of reviving the work of the shipyard allowed Sarkozy to position himself as the guarantor of stability of the French industry, especially as the amount of the contract – about €1.37 billion – would lead to the long-term stability of the shipyard. Therefore, agreeing to this contract was for Sarkozy a win-win deal in both his international and domestic political agenda, which allowed him to easily overlook the concerns emitted by partners in the U.S. and Europe.

A flat-footed France? Reactions from 2014 on

The election of François Hollande to the presidency in June 2012, combined with the onset of the crisis of the annexation of Crimea, were the harbingers of a changed French position. Not only did François Hollande not share his predecessor’s interest in transforming Russia, but pressure on France by concerned partners was significantly increased. While Hollande’s initial goal was to honor the contract agreed upon under the previous presidency, the events in Eastern Ukraine led to a different calculation in France, based on a combination of foreign and domestic factors, and which led to the slow and cumbersome process of the cancellation of the sale. At the heart of these factors are issues of solidarity between France and its Eastern partners, and also a strategic calculation by France that its geopolitical interests would be better served by a cancellation of the sale, despite the domestic (and financial) costs that the presidency would pay for it. This process of cancellation, drawn out by legal proceedings, did not play out in favor of France, as public communication about the process was fragmentary and led to continued doubts about eventual cancelation.

In early September 2014, just a day before the NATO Summit in Wales, President Hollande announced that France would suspend the delivery of the ships to Russia, and conditioned any future progress to a ceasefire in Ukraine and a political agreement between Ukraine and Russia. This was the first step – and arguably, the decisive one – of on overall uncontrolled narrative by the French government around the issue of cancellation. While partners expected that France would announce nothing less than an outright cancellation of the sale, the optics of a mere suspension raised eyebrows about the willingness of France to exercise solidarity, and instead gave the image of a country detached from the realities of the Alliance and preoccupied first and foremost with financial issues.

Therefore, the beginning of the cancellation process also marks the moment when France lost the ability to control the narrative, a fact that the government rued severely. The rhetoric after September 2014 was accompanied by deadlines specifying that the conditions should be fulfilled by the end of November in order for the delivery to resume. When the date came and eyes turned towards Paris in awaiting the decision, officials were less than forthcoming in providing answers, which allowed for the continued propagation of Russian views and lies about the debate. Faced with an aggressive partner-cum-rival who fed its rhetoric to an increasingly strong opposition to the cancellation in France, the government never was able to provide strong responses, due to the fact that ongoing legal proceedings with Russia about the cancellation didn’t allow for strong public discourses about the process, at the risk of giving Russian lawyers extra leverage in the negotiations regarding the reimbursement.

The political opposition to the cancellation came at a time when Hollande’s popularity was at an all-time low, again reinforcing the image of weakness of the French official response. Opponents, ranging from France’s extreme-left to the extreme-right, argues that the costs of not delivering the ship and paying the penalty that was quoted by Russian press would further degrade France’s economic situation, and would also have an impact on the “credibility” of the confidence of France’s engagements as a defense contractor. France was then engaged in negotiations with India, Egypt and Qatar over the purchase of the vaunted Rafale fighter jets that had never been successfully exported since their creation in the late 1980s, and it was thought that a cancellation of the Mistral deal would affect the value of existing French contracts and/or negotiations with international partners. These opposition voices gave Russia an incentive not to find a quick resolution to the ongoing reimbursement process, as drawing it out fulfilled the objective of fostering divisions between populations in a key European country such as France, which also diminished the power of Hollande in any other discussion with Russia, such as for example the Minsk II agreements that were agreed upon in February 2015. 

France’s changed geopolitical assessments

Parallel with this opposition, the government also had to make assessments based on its own position towards the conflict in Russia and its stature in the Alliance. France, removed geographically from the Russian threat and remaining one the biggest military players in Europe, was under clear pressure to showcase solidarity with embattled Allies in the East, which it was only reluctantly in capacity to do, as 2014 marked the height of dual French engagement in Mali and the Central African Republic. Therefore, the ability to divest meaningful capabilities to the Eastern flank was limited, even if France eventually played a strong role in the air policing missions in the Baltic Sea region. The political leadership of France was also interested in pushing forward with the sanctions policy, where the issue of the Mistral caused complications. Given that the rhetoric in September 2014 was limited to a halt of the sale, France refused to integrate the sale of the Mistral in “phase two” sanctions that were discussed at the time, and conditioned any inclusion of the sale in any discussions of “phase three” sanctions which were off the table at that point. This again complicated the position of France towards its European partners, especially as France ensured that any sanctions on arms deliveries to Russia would not have a retroactive effect. The arguments most heard in France, besides the lack of a public debate about the opportunity of the sale, related to the fact that Germany and the UK were doing no better in terms of solidarity by refusing to start discussions about their deep industrial and energy links, or the City’s financial linkages with Russian oligarchs.

The combination of a complicated legal process, a deepening political opposition, and an apathetic public opinion created the impression of a France that was dragging its feet to exercise solidarity, in a case where the solution seemed to be simple. At the same time, prevailing visions in the government, regarding the renewed role of France as a great power, and shorter term geopolitical calculations won over in the struggle between these two poles. First of all, besides the immediate geopolitical considerations – Crimea, MH17 – concerning Russian adherence to international law and solidarity with partners, French thinking was very much influenced by a calculation as to how the sale would influence its standing in Europe, and would constitute a fatal blow to its vision of a political Europe and of a stronger European defense.

These two elements were central in the campaign speeches of candidate Hollande, and any sort of backtracking would harm the credibility of France as a “leader of Europe”, especially at a time when it sought to assert leadership over European foreign policy to make up for the perceived overbearing leadership of Germany in economic affairs. Secondly, the cost/benefit calculations of the delivery of the Mistral at the end of 2014 were crystal clear: while a delivery would contribute close to nothing positive in French-Russian relations, nor would it achieve the goal of making Russia a better partner in ongoing discussions about Iran or Syria, the political and economic costs of an isolated France within Europe were characterized, and to a certain extent, clearly measurable. The clearest example concerned the ongoing modernization process of the Polish armed forces, where Defense Minister Tomasz Siemoniak cheekily remarked that the delivery of the Mistral “is not helping to make positive decisions” in the case of procurement of anti-missile defense systems. Due to Poland maintaining a special place in terms of French industrial interests, the warning of Polish officials did not fall on deaf ears. Therefore, the political calculations converged to indicate that the mid- and long-term relationship with Europe should be prioritized over short-term financial interests with a partner that could no longer conceivably be viewed as one, in the short or long term.

All in all, France engaged in the process of buying time with Russia, while waiting to complete actionable assessments of what a delivery would (and would not) mean for France’s standing in the world. It was eventually decided that French autonomie stratégique would be better preserved by cancelling the sale outright. This is especially true in regards to current French geostrategic priorities, which are mostly focused on sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East. France, being engaged in Mali since January 2013 to root out armed jihadi groups in the country, and in Iraq (and then Syria), being an original member of the coalition striking the positions of the Islamic State group. It is clear that French interests, as the operation in Mali has demonstrated, cannot be satisfied alone, and require the support of the U.S. and especially of its European partners. Therefore, the catastrophic breakdown in solidarity that would have represented the delivery of the Mistral would also have had certain consequences on the French’s ability to answer the challenges that they have been setting out to resolve. More broadly, the delivery would also have damaged France’s still-fragile role in NATO, a mere five years after reintegrating the Alliance’s military command, France’s position and influence would have been significantly damaged. Looking back at the operation in Libya, where NATO played an essential support role in the originally French (and British) operation, it is a clear symbol of the deep interconnectedness between France and the Alliance, and of how the Alliance can play a role as a force multiplier in supporting French interests and initiatives.

The changing politics of solidarity

The delivery of the Mistral is a powerful symbol of how the exercise of solidarity continues to affect dynamics in the Alliance, whether it is solidarity of France towards embattled partners facing the threats of a resurgent Russia, or solidarity by other Allies to help France (and others) combat the threats posed by terrorism and radical Islam. The prevalent idea according to which “solidarity goes both ways” is at play here, and was at the heart of the French decision-making process. The cancellation of the sale also goes to show that transatlantic strategic interests are better served by a like-minded community, and has sent a message to Russia regarding France’s willingness to take economic risks in order to preserve the unity of the Alliance. This last point is especially important in the face of domestic criticism that François Hollande faced regarding the cancellation, which provided an opportunity for him to deeply anchor French strategic interests in the Allied and European interests, and also to stave off challenges from the right and far right parties, who have historically shown proximity towards Russia, and as of recently even expressed admiration for the leadership of Vladimir Putin (notably MPs such as Thierry Mariani or Jacques Myard, and also National Front leader Marine Le Pen). The lack of success of Russia in sowing the seeds of division in France represents a teachable opportunity of how Allied solidarity is often stronger than Russian destabilization, not to say agitprop in the case of the Mistral delivery, in cases of collective security.  

NATO’s evolving comfort zones?

The issues of solidarity lie deeply at the heart of the turning point at which NATO finds itself before the NATO Summit. As an Alliance, NATO has an obligation to balance its orientations in order to meet all the threats that it perceives. When a resurgent Russia has left its Eastern flank more than uncomfortable, and now with the need at the Warsaw summit to turn immediate reassurance into long-lasting deterrence, diffuse threats in the South, symbolized by continued instability in Libya and Iraq, the seeming impossibility of containing a developing crisis in Syria and the subsequent rise of the Islamic State group on the territory of these three countries, has left millions of refugees knocking at the door of Europe. In a context where collective security and territorial defense are under such tensions, counting on a solidary Alliance is central to being able to devise responses to these juxtaposed crises.

It may seem obvious to say that the challenges are multi-faceted, just as it should be obvious that NATO cannot meet them all; in effect, NATO and its Allies should be able to set clear objectives for the Alliance, and together think through the tools - political and military - that it needs to fulfill them. The risk of not doing so may well be a breakdown in solidarity that would be arduous to walk back. In doing so, the Alliance would also go through an exercise that was planned for the Wales summit in 2014, but which was set aside when the situation in Ukraine deteriorated: setting its comfort zones, and planning for them appropriately. The main difference is that these comfort zones are now structured by tensions in the neighborhood where the values that unite NATO (and its partners) are threatened, contrary to the pre-2014 period that offered more strategic certainties than now. That is one point that Allies can agree on easily, even if the existing dividing lines may make this exercise more complex, even if absolutely necessary.

The dividing lines structure themselves around the geographical ones that the security challenges dictate. The easy option in dealing with simultaneous crisis is to structure the response around a simple area-based division of labor, which, to a certain extent, is already in place today: countries such as France and Italy have the ability to project power in their Southern neighborhoods with more efficiency and success, much like Poland can oversee and drive the process of deterring Russia in cooperation with its regional, like-minded partners. On the other hand, divisions of labor tend to favor regional or adhoc approaches, and can cause harm to the fundamental unity and cohesion of the Alliance. However, given ongoing budget constraints, and despite marginal increases in certain countries, the expectations that even major countries (and spenders) may be able to meet all challenges, or at least contribute to addressing them, seems to be today illusory. NATO therefore needs to engage in a thought process in determining its comfort zone regarding a geographical division of labor among its Allies, by proposing solutions to accompany this movement. This involves, on the part of the Alliance, the necessity to increase the flexibility of its structures in order to allow small groups of countries to plug their capabilities in the command and control structures of the Alliance, such as is planned in the German-led Framework Nations Concept.

Solidarity and resilience clashing?

The issue of the delivery of the Mistral has confronted the Alliance with an active case of how solidarity is under stress; the current geopolitical configuration also provides us with a wealth of examples of how Allied solidarity is being challenged, and how political and communication tools need to be adapted in order to tackle these challenges. Doing this will require us to assess how comfortable we are with our dividing lines, both within the Alliance and within Europe. In Europe, the meaning of solidarity has almost been lost, as the notion has been called upon numerous times in the past few years. Northern Europeans were asked to express solidarity with Greece in order to save the Eurozone, leading to a north-south divide; Central and Eastern Europeans were asked to express solidarity with Western Europe in welcoming refugees; in the meanwhile, populist factions benefit from this “solidarity fatigue” to exploit the divides that have been created, a trend that shows no sign of fatigue itself.

In essence, any discussion about solidarity links to the real question of the resilience of our Western societies. How states can build up their resilience to new challenges, ranging from traditional security threats to cyber , to the long-term effects of unregulated climate change to continued pressures from the refugee crisis, has become a key issue for policy-makers across Europe. However, the importance of building up resilience does not prevent politicians from playing the low games of politics: in a speech in front of one of the two Mistral ships from which the Cyrillic characters has been hastily washed off, François Hollande expressed optimism that French and Russia could successfully conclude new shipbuilding contracts in the future. In this, Hollande offered a resounding notion of the sometimes-corrosive cynicism of international politics, and of how national interests can pervert the exercise of solidarity. When strategic interests and long-term visions don’t match, the Mistral delivery teaches us, solidarity may be left by the wayside.