

THE RĪGA  
CONFERENCE

Latvian Transatlantic Organisation

2021



## **POLICY BRIEF**

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# **THE BIDEN DOCTRINE AND THE BALTIC STATES. FROM RHETORIC TO ACTION**

Sandis Šrāders  
George Spencer Terry

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## **The Rīga Conference Policy Briefs Introductory Remarks**

Dear the Rīga Conference Participants, Dear Readers,

In 2021, international relations have still been sailing in troubled waters, and further answers have been sought to issues related to the long-term impact of the Covid-19 pandemic on global development.

This year, on the one hand, existing triggers have augmented: rapid developments and power shift in Afghanistan with potentially global consequences; Russia's escalation of tension and sabre-rattling at the Ukrainian border; increasing confrontation between Israel and the Palestinian Authority; and an irresponsible behaviour by the Belarusian regime. On the other hand, also the issues long in the focus of international agenda have retained their urgency: competition among global and regional powers; increasing risks to international rule of law and democratic values; climate change; the diverse faces of the migration challenge; the ever-increasing role of new technologies in tackling foreign policy matters; and the fight against disinformation.

It still calls for a responsible and broad-based approach on the part of the international community to achieve results conducive to global development and security. The further implementation of the European Green Deal policy and the NATO reflection process 2030 have been significant contribution to this end.

International processes are growing increasingly sophisticated and intricate, when alongside a classical approach to diplomacy foreign policy makers and implementers are expected to come up with swift, unconventional and creative, while at the same time sustainable and effective solutions. They demonstrate the need for a more inclusive approach that results

in even more governmental and non-governmental actors being engaged in foreign policy.

I wish the readers of the Rīga Conference Policy Briefs to continue enriching their insights and knowledge of regional and global foreign policy processes and be active in generating new ideas on their path towards that goal.

**Edgars Rinkēvičs**

Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Latvia



## Rīga Conference Policy Briefs Introductory Remarks

“Peace” is defined as “a period in which there is no war”<sup>1</sup> or “freedom from disturbance; tranquility”<sup>2</sup>. Like before, this year, globally, there were neither. While there have been breakthroughs in combating the COVID pandemic with vaccination roll-out and major economic stimuli from governments, the virus is continuing to disturb our daily lives. The war in Eastern Ukraine is still ongoing as Ukraine battles for its’ territorial integrity, while in Georgia the same fight has become a frozen conflict. The hybrid warfare is maturing and becoming more complex as demonstrated by Lukashenko’s regime in hijacking the Ryanair flight, as well as in orchestrating the recent breaches of Latvian, Lithuanian and Polish borders by brutally using innocent, misled people as hybrid warfare tools. There is little tranquility in our societies. Dis-information continued to be a troublesome weapon throughout the year and it has fueled further divisions among people with anti-vaccination campaigns being the most prominent theme. The attack on the U.S. Capitol in the beginning of the year, the rise of conspiracy theories and populism are clear symptoms of confused, scared and/or angry people.

Existing security challenges, such as Russia’s opportunism and constant military build-up, uncertainty of terrorism threats boosted by the Taliban take-over in Afghanistan, unpredictable climate cataclysms, together with emerging challenges related to advancements in technology and supply chain vulnerabilities will only add to this unrest, this state in-between peace and war.

As a result, demand for security will continue to increase. And Western democracies must be able to deliver. Winston Churchill once famously said:

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<sup>1</sup> Oxford Languages

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*

“Never let a good crisis go to waste”. Thus, we must learn the lessons and act decisively to ensure security – to ensure that our democracies are prepared and capable to overcome whatever might come our way. To ensure that our societies feel safe and become more resilient in the face of ever evolving challenges. In this endeavor Western democracies need to do more and together to achieve true peace.

Open discussion, exchange of knowledge and ideas can certainly help to seek answers on how to do it better and I believe this year’s Riga Conference will be a valuable opportunity to do so.

**Artis Pabriks**

Minister of Defence of the Republic of Latvia



# **THE BIDEN DOCTRINE AND THE BALTIC STATES. FROM RHETORIC TO ACTION**

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## INTRODUCTION

The election of Joseph R. Biden as president of the United States has had profound implications not only for domestic US politics but also for US international partners abroad. Due to Donald Trump's statements about NATO being obsolete and past alliances as unnecessary, one of Biden's first tasks in Europe would be to repair this part of Trump's legacy. As Biden mentioned during the 2021 Munich Security Conference, all allies would like to see "the United States working closely with European Union partners and the capitals across the continent – from Rome to Riga – to meet the range of shared challenges we face" ("Remarks by President Biden at the 2021 Virtual Munich Security Conference" 2021). This task might turn out to be more challenging than these first optimistic international promises, as



**European and US priorities are now different and not necessarily shared.**

In his inaugural speech as president at the beginning of 2017, Trump promised a stark juxtaposition with precedent. He promised the return to 'America First' policies, continuing the isolationist America First Committee paradigm that was the foremost opponent of US involvement in the Second World War. Moreover, since US international engagements depend on the popular and elite support at home, Trump broke with foreign policy traditions and expectations. First, he opposed his own Republican Party, which tends to be more hawkish and unilateral in foreign affairs. Of course, he stood up against opposition from the Democratic political establishment that usually upheld softer international engagement through tools such as diplomacy, institutions, and trade. In the end, this defiant attitude paired with bipartisan fatigue relating to international

overstretch and engagements of the United States, restless policing and stabilization missions, never-ending wars in the Middle East and elsewhere, and the draining of US resources for schools in Afghanistan but not in Alabama (Kupchan 2020, 1–5) came together to feed his nativistic political program. Eventually, he also opposed democratic traditions, institutions, policies, and networks of politicians and bureaucracies domestically.

Internationally, this Trump era stood against Jeffersonian foreign policy traditions, which prioritize democratic traditions at home. It stood against Wilsonian foreign policy traditions, prioritizing democracy and the rule of law abroad to stabilize the international system. It poorly utilized more hawkish Jacksonian (prioritizing American security and national interests) and Hamiltonian (prioritizing American commercial-corporate interests) traditions (Mead 2009). Eventually, Trump's legacy is profound from one aspect. It illuminated the strong fault lines in US society as well as the political structures that eventually rendered US foreign policy less efficient and effective. His legacy is less profound or related to any of the foreign policy traditions from the past, as he cared less about the United States internationally than his own reelection for a second presidential term (Bolton 2020).

## ARRIVING AT A BIDEN DOCTRINE

**At least in terms of rhetoric, speeches on the campaign trail and at the beginning of the Biden presidency harkened back to the pre-Trump status quo, where the United States would go about jointly building consensus-led, multilateral policies with her allies in the sphere of foreign affairs.** These speech acts represented an active reversal from President Trump's unilateral actions, such as pulling 9,500 US soldiers out of bases in Germany while demanding that all NATO member states raise their defense spending to at least 2 percent of GDP, which raised questions throughout Europe on the reliability of the United States as a strategic partner (Quinn 2020). So, while this rhetoric brought to mind the historical ties and partnership between Europe and the United States since the end of the Second World War onward, **President Biden also had to mend trust amongst the most powerful US allies on the continent, France and Germany.**

At the onset, the Biden administration carried out an active campaign of public diplomacy in order to repair these relationships that had been strained during the Trump era. While President Biden visited European capitals (*Euro-news* 2021), stressing the deep and natural ties between and among these nations, the State Department concurrently published a series of weekly infographics and quotes that highlighted the long-standing partnerships that the United States has upheld throughout the world (“The United States and France: Allies, Partners, and Friends” 2021; “The United States and Germany: Strengthening Our Alliance” 2021). It seemed that the United States that everyone knew and was used to doing business with was back. Building upon such developments, President Biden’s resolute yet “constructive” position against President Putin during the June 2021 Geneva Summit, despite not leading to any tangible policy outcomes, strengthened these views.

However, August and September 2021 dealt two self-inflicted blows to US credibility in the European security environment. The first of these injuries was the disastrous retreat from Afghanistan. While the United States had previously announced its intention to withdraw all forces, the miscommunication, shirking of responsibility amongst officials, and botched execution resulted in both a humanitarian and public relations disaster. The final victory of the Taliban has compounded two more issues for the United States.

First,

**“ the credibility of US support amongst its more vulnerable allies becomes less tenable if the United States no longer offers this support when it is no longer politically tenable on the domestic level**

(“Most Americans Say the Wars in Afghanistan and Iraq Were Not Worth Fighting” 2021). If the United States abandons one of its key priorities in the common fight against terrorism within NATO, should governments such as those of the Baltic states feel confident about security guarantees to its more

vulnerable partners? The damage these events and images have inflicted on the reputation of the United States – in terms of competence, commitment to human rights, playing a leadership role in the international community – is real and likely to persist (Kertzer 2021).

Second, the resilience of the Taliban in its fight against the United States and the complete reversal of social programs enacted during the past twenty years in a matter of weeks have shown that the advancement of the liberal democratic worldview is not inevitable. Due to the progressive spirit that animates President Biden's policies both at home and abroad, the victory of an under-equipped militia of religious fundamentalists over this progressive order provides an even more problematic incoherence. The confluence of these two problematic factors of **the Afghanistan withdrawal – weakened credibility of the United States as a strategic partner and an unexpected recession of the liberal international order – lend to a repressed pessimism in Kyiv and Taipei and a quiet jubilation in Moscow, Damascus, and ostensibly in Beijing.** Russia has overtly prioritized pan-Eurasian alliances, preferring allies such as China against the liberal democratic world order under the *Pax Americana* (Karaganov and Suslov 2018).

The second of these blows came in an oblique trajectory through the establishment of AUKUS, which is a trilateral security pact between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States announced in mid-September of 2021. In purely regional terms, focusing on the Indo-Pacific, this move toward deepening cooperation has a sound strategic logic in countering Chinese influence in the South China Sea and beyond. Nevertheless, this decision had reverberations on the other side of the globe, as the establishment of this framework meant that France would now lose out on an 80 billion defense contract for submarines, which is nearly three percent of France's annual GDP and came as a complete surprise for Paris. While the French response has been furiously impotent in the meantime, recalling ambassadors from Washington and Canberra (Cohen and Shear 2021) and cancelling ongoing talks regarding defense with the United Kingdom (*Reuters* 2021), France has traditionally been the loudest voice in the European Union calling for strategic autonomy from the United States (Tarquinio 2021; "Proposals for an EU Army

Re-Emerge after Afghan Pullout – but Many Remain “Hard to Convince” 2021). In addition, this move by the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia provoked a rare statement from the European Commission condemning the action (*POLITICO* 2021). Furthermore, the German political establishment’s most stinging comment situates this affair as an insult to a NATO partner and continues by declaring, “US president Joe Biden is treating allies in the same way his predecessor Donald Trump did” (Chazan 2021). In the future, this perceived slight could well act as an impetus for France to formulate more concrete proposals for establishing this strategic autonomy, especially with the traditional counterweight of the United Kingdom no longer playing a role in EU internal decision making.

This evolution leads us to a discussion of whether a clearly defined Biden Doctrine can be articulated at this present, tumultuous moment. In Biden’s own words, “the U.S.-Chinese rivalry as a part of a larger “contest with autocrats” over “whether democracies can compete... in the rapidly changing twenty-first century” (Brands 2021). Whether or not this denotes the central point of a doctrine is another story. Nevertheless, some voices answer with a decisive no (Toosi 2021), claiming that the first year of the Biden presidency has been wracked by a relative incoherence. Others caution that this nascent doctrine still needs time to develop (*The Economist* 2021). Another faction states that yes, a Biden Doctrine has emerged (Brands 2021; Bush 2021), and it can be characterized as a deepening of US commitments with the aspiration of balancing against a continually rising China without a widening and overstressing of this coalition.

**While the debacle in Afghanistan may be nothing more than a tragic miscalculation of grand strategy, the fallout from the establishment of AUKUS has shown that even decisions that would be fully in line with this Biden Doctrine can have unintended outcomes that nonetheless can weaken Western solidarity.** If this approach of the Biden Doctrine does mark the characteristics of an “empire in decline” (Politi 2021), then each decision to deepen certain aspects of US commitments would have to be equally weighted so as to not result in such indiscriminate political fallout.

## THE RUSSIA COROLLARY

If this does represent the spirit of the Biden Doctrine but not its ways and means, and if the next several years of US foreign policy shall be guided by balancing China through Western solidarity, where does that leave Russia? **Remaining sinocentric in this discourse, Russia upholds many strategy partnerships with China.** They are joint founding members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and Russia declared its interest in taking part of the Belt and Road Initiative as a key transit route for the New Eurasian Landbridge and the China-Mongolia-Russia corridor (Zemánek 2020). **Both Russia and China share a vision of a multipolar world with zones of exclusive influence wherein they would be unfettered by a Western rules-based international order.** However, in each of these relationships, Russia plays either an equal or subservient role as a partner or transit country, relegated away from its aspirations of regional or global dominance. As the years go on, Russia's role in this partnership will diminish even further, as the Chinese economy will continue to grow and the Chinese military will continue to modernize. In either of these situations, Russia would have neither a relative nor absolute advantage in terms of what strategic resources it could contribute to this partnership.

In this way, US interaction with Russia within a rarified Biden Doctrine would only be secondary to counterbalancing China. However, **the Kremlin has never allowed itself to be demoted from great power, at least in its own eyes. On this assumption alone, it can be expected that Russia will continue its adventurism in what it perceives as its own exclusive sphere of influence, the Near Abroad.** A term derived from the countries that claimed their independence after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Near Abroad can be divided into four geographical and cultural regions: Central Asia, the South Caucasus, the post-Soviet countries of Eastern Europe, and the Baltic states.

Central Asia is the region wherein Russia and China have room for both cooperation and competition. As one of the main transit regions for the Belt and Road Initiative, it is crucial for Beijing to maintain positive relations there with local elites. However, due to historical circumstances, these elites and local populations have ties to Russia due to the role of Russian as a *lingua*

*franca* and large minorities of ethnic Russians in countries such as Kazakhstan (18.7 percent of the population). In the past decade, competition in the region between China and Russia did not flare up, even with dependence on Chinese imports increasing in each country. Nevertheless, these purely economic ties are beginning to seep into other areas of society, as the Chinese Communist Party has begun to publish newspapers in local languages (*Kazakh Telegraph Agency* 2021). As Biden's United States has pulled out of Afghanistan, its strategic considerations in Central Asia have also diminished; as widening partnerships and promoting democratic liberalism can be done only on a mutually voluntary basis,

**“Central Asia will remain in this ‘New Great Game’ between Russia and China— a friendly game of checkers for now rather than a heated game of chess.**

The South Caucasus and the post-Soviet countries of Eastern Europe in turn represent the regions of Russia's Near Abroad that most closely adhere to the Kremlin's ideal. While Ukraine and Georgia had opted for westward orientation, Russia's support of separatists, direct military action, or annexation of territory have frozen any further integration for the time being. Russia enjoys the role of a power broker between Armenia and Azerbaijan, without even needing to provide any support to its preferred ally in the conflict.

Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko's brash response to protests against his regime, including extralegal detentions and abductions of the opposition, has forced him into a position wherein his only external benefactor would be Russia. His past days of playing Brussels and Moscow off of each other have come to an end, and although this situation might cause some unease in the Kremlin due to Lukashenko's unpredictability in the short term, it may lead to long-term opportunities of further integration between the two states. Despite US sanctions against Lukashenko's regime and assurances to the strategic partners of Georgia and Ukraine, Russia still continues to have the most autonomy and freedom of action in the South Caucasus and Eastern

Europe, especially if current commitments to partners are not expected to be widened. Statements of concern and sanctions have their limits in restricting Russian courses of action.

## **CAUGHT IN BETWEEN A ROCK AND A SOFT PLACE**

The last of the regions of this Near Abroad, the Baltic states, is largely not conceived in this way anymore, thirty years after the collapse of the Soviet Union. From the early days of regaining their independence, the Baltic states separately made the conscious decision to align themselves to the requirements, norms, and structures of the European Union for their democratic adherence and NATO as a security guarantee. By their entry into Euro-Atlantic institutions in 2004, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania believed that both their prosperity and their sovereignty had been secured, and for the most part, they were correct in their assumptions.

For having held on too tightly to Soviet era governance practices and leadership, Georgia suffered from Russian aggression. Ukraine was punished by Russia for trying to establish its own independent relations with and as part of the West while nonetheless pragmatically taking advantage of its position between East and West. In contrast, the Baltic states had been rewarded for their foresight and prudence. Nevertheless, this entrenchment in Western structures does not mean that Russia has not tried to influence and destabilize them in other, more covert ways.

**For the past decades, the modus operandi of Russia has been to primarily engage in plausibly deniable information and cyber campaigns against the Baltic states in order to provoke societal destabilization.** The most impactful of such actions was the disinformation campaign surrounding the transferal of the so-called Bronze Soldier monument in Tallinn from 26-29 April 2007, which was marked by coordinating riots and a covert cyber-attacks (Juurvee and Mattissen 2020). Nevertheless, these events acted as an incentive for Estonia to develop its cyber defense capabilities (*BBC News* 2017). Additional provocations from Russia include the weaponization of its

compatriots policy through claims of discrimination of Russian speakers in the Baltic states and inherent “russophobia”, which is amplified both through statements by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Daventry 2021) and by propagandistic news articles in local iterations of Sputnik.

However,



**Russian policies toward the Baltic states have become more provocative during the Biden presidency.**

An Estonian diplomat was detained in Saint Petersburg (“Estonia Decries Detention of Diplomat in Russia” 2021), the three Baltic states were placed on a list of ‘unfriendly’ countries (*The Baltic Times* 2021), and Russian ethnic organizations were barred from participation in the World Finno-Ugric Conference in Tartu, Estonia (Shtepa 2021). While the *Zapad*-2017 exercises did simulate the closure of the Suwalki gap by a joint Russian and Belarusian force (Sukhankin 2017), the leaked battle plans of the *Zapad*-2021 drills implied that Russia would be willing to aid Belarus in occupying and annexing the Vilnius region of Lithuania and the Podlaskie Voivodeship of Poland (Kofman 2021). Russia has allowed migrants to cross its territories (Goble 2021) so that Belarusian authorities could take these people to the edges of Poland and Lithuania and push them over the border with the intent of actively causing a humanitarian crisis. Despite President Biden’s focus on China as the nexus of his doctrinal development, Russia has continued to cause existential challenges on NATO and the European Union’s eastern flank.

## TWO IMAGES OF THE FUTURE

Such a situation leads to two prognoses for Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania within the Biden doctrine. However, each of these two images operates under an assumption. In the first case, the exercise of this doctrine would lead to unintended consequences that will weaken Western solidarity, such

as the recent controversy caused by the AUKUS deal. Moreover, actors such as France (and Germany in solidarity) might gain partisan support for an alternative proposal for the architecture of European security. This trend would also gain strong support in the Kremlin since more autonomy would mean less American presence in European security affairs. For the second model, the strategic implementation of the Biden doctrine would lead to its goal of deepened ties amongst extant partners and allies while also acting as a counterbalance to all autocratic powers— not solely against China.

From the viewpoint of the Baltic states, the realization of this first image would leave them in a precarious position. The disastrous visit of EU High Representative Josep Borrell to Moscow in February 2021 (*Financial Times* 2021) exemplifies the limits of EU foreign initiatives on their own. The visit of Finnish Minister of Foreign Affairs Pekka Haavisto on the following day underlined the disjointed internal position that the EU has toward Russia, (Braghiroli and Makarychev 2021) wherein Russia will deal bilaterally with EU member states on issues of shared interest. Finland provides only one example. The German economic interests regarding Nord Stream 2 have superseded security and normative concerns. **From the Baltic point of view, NATO's security guarantees are what keep Russia from exploiting these continental competing interests to their detriment.** However, if the European Union presents itself as an independent pole in upcoming geopolitical shifts of power precipitated by a rising China and a United States that clumsily postures itself against this rise, the viability of this guarantee is not certain.

“ **If Europe does not want to take part in the ‘New Cold War’ as a result of a botched Biden doctrine, NATO would face an existential crisis when pressured by renewed and stronger claims for European strategic autonomy.** ”

Such a rift between Western Europe— those pushing for autonomy — and Eastern Europe— staunch US allies within Euro-Atlantic structures — is an anxiety for the Baltic states. Without the traditional champion of NATO within the European Union as it had been with the United Kingdom counterbalancing France, this fear could become a reality.

Conversely, the ideal paradigm of a successfully realized Biden doctrine rests on a complete return to the *status quo ante Trumpum*, wherein the United States would be understood as the uncontested leader of a unipolar liberal democratic order. Truly multilateral decisions would be made, coming to full consensus insofar as key NATO member states such as France would not feel as if their interests are not considered in strategic calculus. While China would remain a focal point in the contest with autocrats, the wider anti-liberal democratic world — Russia included — would have to be pushed back against as well. Instead of only balancing its adversaries, the United States needs to also balance its allies. Whether this is to occur is the project of the next three years.

Nevertheless, *ceteris paribus*, trends point toward the first of these two images. While the first year of the Biden presidency has been filled with reassuring rhetoric, policy outcomes have continued the doubts in the capacity of US leadership that began in the Trump years. It is now for the Biden administration to not solely repair the bonds of trust broken by his predecessor, but Biden must also rebuild confidence in the United States, which has been shaken in August and September of 2021.

Where are the Baltic states in these hypothetical paradigms? Since their regained independence, all three have voluntarily complied with EU and NATO norms and regulations. All three meet defense spending requirements as part of their obligations to the alliance, carried out with the hope that such loyalty would be rewarded if Russia were to turn to the Baltics in the same way it ravaged Ukraine and Georgia. The role of the Baltic states, therefore, does not change. Even during the uncertainty of the Trump administration, the Baltic states made sure that their dedication to Euro-Atlantic structures was evident, gestures that seemed to be appreciated by the United States. In the first image, then, where the security environment of NATO's Eastern Flank would be more

uncertain due to fissures between the interests of European powers regarding the necessity of strategic autonomy, the Baltic states act as a challenging test of NATO solidarity when put under enough pressure. Conversely, if the Biden doctrine does lead to a higher degree of cohesion amongst established allies, then the Baltic states have no reason to change their posture, for example, in raising the issues of human rights in Belarus and security threats from Russia. Either way, **it is the deciding role of the United States (through its prudent implementation of a sober Biden doctrine) that will decide whether the Baltic states represent an opportunity for further destabilization of Western solidarity or a bulwark of this solidarity to the East.**

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THE LATVIAN TRANSATLANTIC ORGANISATION  
(LATO) IN ACTION

## LATO

LATO is a non-governmental organisation established in 2000. Its aims are to inform the public about NATO and Latvia's membership in the Alliance, to organise informative public events about Latvian and Euro-Atlantic security issues, to promote partnerships with other countries, to lay the foundations for Latvia's international role as a member of NATO, and to foster the international community's understanding of Latvia's foreign and security policy aims. During the past 20 years, LATO has numerous achievements to be proud of. LATO organises the most influential security conference in the Baltic Sea region: The Rīga Conference facilitates discussion about issues affecting the transatlantic community and annually gathers international experts in foreign affairs and security/defence matters, policy makers, journalists, and business representatives. LATO promotes policy relevant research on topics such as gender equality, peace and security, resilience in the borderland, and the subjective perception of security. A series of various initiatives intended for increasing the interest of Latvian, Baltic and European youth in security related issues have been put in motion, including an annual future leader's forum and masterclasses for young political leaders. LATO's most recent project is the Secure Baltics platform, which serves as an information hub for those who are eager to join the debate on international security.

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## SECURE BALTICS

LATO has launched a new internet platform SecureBaltics ([www.securebaltics.eu](http://www.securebaltics.eu)). The site gathers different materials – policy briefs, discussions, interviews, studies, educational materials – created in the framework of the Rīga Conference, as well as work from our partners. It is a stable platform that the Rīga Conference community can rely on and use as a credible source of information in the region.

## **Purpose**

The purpose of the platform is to collect the know-how that is generated by the excellent minds gathered at the Rīga Conference on an annual basis. The Rīga Conference gathers regional and international experts in foreign policy and defence, academics, journalists, and business representatives by promoting the discussions on issues affecting the transatlantic community. It has been growing in influence since its inception in 2006.

Every year, for two days the National Library of Latvia is the centre of the most important regional discussions on security issues. However, it is not enough to engage in these discussions only once a year. Therefore, LATO developed SecureBaltics as a practical tool which can encourage the use of any resources and materials that have been produced as part of the Rīga Conference or its follow-up events.

## **Reach**

The platform tries to provide materials in both, English and Latvian, in order to reach multiple audiences. It is intended for the traditional Rīga Conference community of opinion leaders and experts in foreign policy and defence matters as well as any other interested parties that could benefit from the generated materials such as high school teachers looking for study materials.

## **Vision**

LATO hopes that SecureBaltics will become the go-to hub for resource associated with defence and security issues in the Baltics within the next few years.

## **Materials**

The platform SecureBaltics provides resources:

- For all interested parties, including expert community, in the form of interviews, policy briefs, commentaries on topical issues
- For teachers and lecturers in the form of study materials and tests that can be included in academic curriculum
- For students in the form of lectures and study materials, as well as interactive study materials through games.

## **Partners**

The SecureBaltics portal is supported by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Latvia and the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Latvia.

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
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